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t Hans Christian Andersen, The Emperor's New Clothes (1837). The Emperor was
approached by weavers, purveyors of fine clothing of the most beautiful colors and elaborate
patterns. The Emperor thought to himself, "had I such a suit, I might at once find out what men
in my realms are fit for their office, and also be able to distinguish the wise from the foolish."
Similarly, the North Carolina General Assembly, by enacting section 110-90.2, adjudges the
character of an individual, except character is not so easily ascertained.
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INTRODUCTION
North Carolina General Statutes section 110-90.2 requires a crimi-
nal record check for all child care providers. The legislature, recogniz-
ing the importance of the early years of life to a child's development,
has declared that the State should protect children in child care facili-
ties. The legislature seeks to protect children by ensuring that child
care facilities provide a safe and healthy environment where children
are cared for by persons of good moral character.' This paper will be
limited in scope to two primary concerns: (1) whether the mandatory
criminal record check best promotes the State's interest in having per-
sons of good moral character care for children; and (2)whether the
statute adequately safeguards the substantive and procedural rights of
child care providers affected by the statute.
In Part I, the paper addresses the broad purposes and implications
of the statute, including the mandated procedures concerning owners
and operators of daycare centers and childcare providers. The legisla-
tive history giving rise to the statute is reviewed, and the responsibili-
ties delegated to the Department of Health and Human Services,
Child Development Division (hereinafter "the Department") are
evaluated. The statutory provisions requiring the Department to en-
sure that the criminal history of all child care providers is checked are
reviewed. Additionally, a review of the criminal record check proce-
dures concerning a child care provider's fitness to have responsibility
for the safety and well-being of children based upon the local, state
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-85 (1999). Legislative intent and purpose. Recognizing the im-
portance of the early years of life to a child's development, the General Assembly hereby de-
clares its intent with respect to the early care and education of children:
(1) The State should protect children in child care facilities by ensuring that these facili-
ties provide a physically safe and healthy environment where the developmental needs of
these children are met and where these children are cared for by qualified persons of good
moral character.
(3) Achieving this level of protection and early education requires the following ele-
ments: mandatory licensing of child care facilities; pro-motion of higher quality child care
through the development of enhanced standards which operators may comply with on a
voluntary basis: and a program of education to help operators improve their programs and
to deepen public understanding of child care needs and issues.
2
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and national check will be conducted. The related importance of
clearly defined procedures regarding the registration of persons sub-
stantiated as having abused or neglected a child will also be explored.
Part II sets forth recommendations for strengthening the enforce-
ment provisions of the statute, and for determining qualifications
based on the criminal history check prior to an individual being em-
ployed as a child care provider or being granted a license as an owner
or operator.
Part III includes recommendations for a cross-check of the Abuse
and Neglect Registry in this state, as well as mandatory searches of
established registries in other jurisdictions.
Part IV addresses the statute's implications concerning the rights,
privileges and responsibilities of child care providers, including own-
ers, operators, and employees of daycare centers. The enumerated
statutory offenses are examined for the purpose of ascertaining
whether all the enumerated offenses are relevant to good moral
character.
Part IV(a) analyzes the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to
owners/operators, employees and nonregistered home care providers,
and Part IV(b) discusses potential Bill of Attainder violations that
may result from strict enforcement of the statute. This discussion in-
cludes a historical analysis of the Bill of Attainder Clause and relevant
United States Supreme Court decisions such as United States v.
Lovett2 and Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv's3.
Part V will include an analysis of the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clause. In particular, this part will evaluate whether the stat-
ute and rules promulgated pursuant to the statute violate substantive
due process, and whether the statute violates procedural due process
and the Equal Protection Clause under the United States and North
Carolina Constitutions.
Finally, Part VI contains conclusions.
I. PURPOSES
The State has a legitimate interest in the safety and welfare of chil-
dren. This interest is manifested by the enactment of legislation in-
tended to ensure that qualified persons of good moral character
provide child care in facilities licensed pursuant to policies, proce-
dures and standards established by the State.4 Legislation enacted in
2. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
3. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv's, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
4. To carry out the legislative intent, the Legislative Study Commission on Child Care was
established. The Commission studies the substantive issues regarding the protection of children,
ensuring a safe environment, and provision of care by qualified persons of good moral character.
2001]
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1997 expresses the legislature's intent to achieve a clearly defined
standard of care for all children under its jurisdiction by establishing
mandatory licensing of child care facilities.5 Additionally, the legisla-
ture seeks to promote higher quality child care through the develop-
ment of enhanced standards, which owners and operators of child care
facilities may comply with on a voluntary basis.6 Finally, the legisla-
tion reflects the lawmakers' interest in child care program enhance-
ment by providing assistance for owners and operators to improve
their programs, and by providing mechanisms to better inform the
public of child care needs and issues.7 The legislature included a pro-
vision for the appointment of a twenty-member commission to study
the substantive issues related to the physical safety, healthy environ-
ment and developmental needs of children.8
The statute applies only to those children participating in "child
care" as that term is narrowly defined in the statute. A child is partici-
pating in child care if the child is in
[a] program or arrangement where three or more children less than 13
years old, who do not reside where the care is provided, receive care
on a regular basis of at least once per week for more than four hours
but less than twenty-four hours per day from persons other than their
guardians or full-time custodians, or from persons not related to them
by birth, marriage, or adoption. 9
There are ten categories of children receiving care that do not come
within the purview of the statute. 10
The commission consists of 20 members. Ten members are to be appointed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, seven of whom shall be members of the House of Representatives
at the time of their appointment, and three of whom shall be members of the general public
interested in child care. Ten members will also be appointed by the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, seven of whom are to be members of the Senate at the time of their appointment,
and three of whom shall be members of the general public. The Commission has the powers and
duties to develop policies, procedures and establish standards pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-
88.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-85(1) (1999).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. §110-85(3) (1999).
7. Id.
8. Id. See also Editor's note referring to session laws 1997-506, s.28.2.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-86(2) (1999).
10. Id. According to section 110-86(2), child care does not include:
a. Arrangements operated in the home of any child receiving care if all of the children in
care are related to each other and no more than two additional children are in care
b. Recreational programs operated for less than four consecutive months in a year;
c. Specialized activities or instruction such as athletics, dance, art, music lessons, horse-
back riding, gymnastics, or organized clubs for children, such as Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts,
4-H groups, or boys and girls clubs:
d. Drop-in or short-term care provided while parents participate in activities that are not
employment related and where the parents are on the premises or otherwise easily
accessible, such as drop-in or short-term care provided in health spas, bowling alleys,
shopping malls, resort hotels, or churches;
e. Public schools;
4
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The location where the child care is provided is considered a child
care facility under the statute, and may include a child care center or a
family care home. 1 The day-to-day authority for the operation of a
child care facility is reposed in the lead teacher, whose duty it is to
plan and implement the daily program of activities for a group of chil-
dren in a child care facility. 12 A child care administrator is responsible
for the operation of a child care facility and is on-site on a regular
basis, while the operator includes the owner, director, or other person
having primary responsibility for the operation of a child care facility
subject to licensing. 3
The legislative commission (hereinafter "the Commission") is em-
powered to develop policies and procedures for issuance of a license
to any child care facility that complies with applicable standards re-
quired by the statute. The Commission has broad powers that encom-
pass rule making, the authority to require submission of compliance
reports, safety inspections before and after licensing, issuance of pro-
visional licenses, and the imposition of sanctions when abuse and neg-
lect are substantiated.' 4 The Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services is the chief administrative officer, whose powers
f. Nonpublic schools described in Part 2 of Article 39 of Chapter 115C of the General
Statutes that are accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools and
that operate a child care facility as defined in subdivision (3) of this section for less than
six and one-half hours per day either on or off the school site;
g. Bible schools conducted during vacation periods;
h. Care provided by facilities licensed under Article 2 of Chapter 122C of the General
Statutes:
i. Cooperative arrangements among parents to provide care for their own children as a
convenience rather than for employment; and
j. Any child care program or arrangement consisting of two or more separate compo-
nents, each of which operates for four hours or less per day with different children
attending each component.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-86(3) (1999). The term "child care facility" includes child care
centers, family child care homes, and any other child care arrangement not excluded by section
110.86(2), that provides child care, regardless of the time of day, wherever operated, and
whether or not operated for profit. In addition, "[a] child care center is an arrangement where,
at any one time, there are three or more preschool-age children or nine or more school age
children receiving care" and a family child care home is "[a] child care arrangement located in a
residence where, at any one time, more than two children, but less than nine children, receive
child care."
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-86(5a) (1999). "Lead teacher" is an individual who is responsi-
ble for planning and implementing the daily program of activities for a group of children in a
child care facility.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-86(2a), (7) (1999). The child care administrator and the operator
arguably can be the same individual. However, the child care administrator is required by stat-
ute to be on site on a regular basis. Statutorily, "on site on a regular basis" is not defined.
Therefore, the administrator would appear to have considerable flexibility concerning when and
how often he is required by statute to be on site. By implication, it would appear that the statute
imposed the duty of meeting the license requirements upon the operator, while the administra-
tive day-to-day operation of the child care facility is left to the control of the child care
administrator.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-88 (1999).
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and duties are delegated under the policies and rules of the Commis-
sion. 5 It is the Secretary's duty to ensure that the Commission's poli-
cies and rules are given effect.16 Administrative personnel may be
employed to implement the legislative edict. 7 The Secretary is also
charged with promoting and coordinating educational programs and
materials for operators of child care facilities, and using the resources
of other state and local agencies and educational institutions where
appropriate.18 However, the appropriation of revenue to fulfill such
purposes is conspicuously absent. Moreover, the statute is silent con-
cerning the concomitant grant of authority to the Secretary over other
state departments and units of local governments from which she may
receive services.
Consequently, it would appear that without a clear legislative man-
date, state departments, units of local government, state and local
agencies, and educational institutions may cooperate with the Secre-
tary where convenient, but are not bound to do so. Because the re-
sources are not directly controlled by the Department, this is a highly
inefficient way of ensuring that the policies and rules of the Commis-
sion are carried out. This concern is even more pronounced where the
Department has the responsibility of enforcing the Commission's
rules as applied to nonregistered home care providers.
"Nonregistered day care home" means an arrangement whereby
day care is provided in a home that is not subject to registration or
licensure pursuant to section 110-86(2) or section 110-106."9 The
Commission's rules only apply to nonregistered day care homes that
voluntarily choose to participate in the state subsidized day care pro-
gram.2 ° Where nonregistered day care homes choose to participate,
the Department is responsible for ensuring that the nonregistered day
care providers comply with the criminal record check requirements
applicable to such providers.2'
The criminal record check procedure is the same for all providers of
child care, including providers employed by child care facilities, child
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90 (1999).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-92 (1999). (Providing that when requested by an operator of a
child care center or by the Secretary, "it shall be the duty of local and district health depart-
ments, building inspector, fire prevention inspector, or fireman employed by local government,
or any fireman having jurisdiction, or other officials or personnel of local government to visit
and inspect a child care center ....").
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90(3) (1999).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90(7) (1999).
19. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10 r. 46G.0109 (June 2000). For those arrangements where day
care is provided that is not subject to registration or licensure pursuant to section 110-86(2) see
supra note 10. Pursuant to section 110-106, certain religion-sponsored child care facilities also
are not subject to the registration or licensure provisions.
20. Id.
21. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2701(d), (h) (June 2000).
6
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care homes, and foster homes. The criminal record checks are con-
ducted in conformance with rules established by the Commission.
The Division of Child Development [hereinafter "the Division"] is re-
sponsible for ensuring that each prospective child care provider's
criminal history is checked.22 The rules require that the child care
provider, at the time of her application, submit to a criminal record
check.2 3 An employee of a child care facility may begin working while
she awaits the processing of her criminal record check. The documen-
tation pertinent to the criminal record check is required to be submit-
ted to her employer within five (5) working days after beginning
work. 4 Every employer must give notice to each new employee that
the employee must acknowledge under penalty of perjury if she has
been convicted of a crime other than a minor traffic violation.25 Every
employee is required to acknowledge on a signed statement for-
warded to the Division that if she has been convicted of a crime speci-
fied in section 110-90.2, her employment is conditional pending
approval by the Division. 6 The employer has three (3) working days
after receipt of the pertinent documents to mail the local criminal his-
tory check, authority for release of information, and fingerprint
card(s) to the Division.27
The information gathered through the criminal record check proce-
dure is considered by the Division in making a determination concern-
ing the child care provider's fitness to have responsibility for the
safety and well-being of children. If the child care provider has been
convicted of a crime, she may submit mitigating information to the
Division. Mitigating information concerning the conviction could be
used by the Division in making the determination of the prospective
child care provider's qualification. The Division may consider, in
making its decision, the following: the length of time since the convic-
tion; the nature of the crime; the circumstances surrounding the com-
mission of the offense; evidence of rehabilitation; the number of prior
offenses; and the age of the individual at the time of occurrence. 28 The
Division's decision to qualify an individual with a conviction, based
22. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.0102(11) (Sept. 2001 Supp.). ("Division" means the
Division of Child Development within the Department of Health and Human Services.)
23. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2701 (June 2000). This rule provides that a prospective
child care provider must submit "a certified criminal history check from the clerk of Superior
Court's office in the county or counties where the individual has resided during the previous 12
months," as well as "a signed Authority for Release of Information" form and a "completed
fingerprint card." N.C. Admin. Code tit. 10, r. 3U.2701(a)(1)-(3) (June 2000) (Sept. 2001 Supp.).
24. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(a) (June 2000).
25. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2701(b) (June 2000) (Sept. 2001 Supp.).
26. Id.
27. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(c) (June 2000).
28. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2701(c) (June 2000) (Sept. 2001 Supp.).
2001]
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upon mitigating information, could place the children at risk. A for-
mal procedure needs to be established by the Division to assess the
veracity and merit of any mitigating information submitted to ensure
the safety and well-being of the children.29 A prospective child care
provider who refuses to complete the criminal record check procedure
provides reasonable cause to deny issuance of a permit. 30 The term
"permit" is not defined. However, "license" is defined as a permit
issued by the Secretary to any child care facility which meets the statu-
tory standards established under this Article.3' Under circumstances
where the applicant is not a "child care facility," refusing to complete
the criminal record check provides reasonable cause to determine that
the prospective child care provider is unfit to have responsibility for
the care of children. 32
A qualified child care provider will be notified in writing that she is
deemed fit to have responsibility for the safety and well-being of chil-
dren based on her criminal history. Ostensibly, the Division has the
discretion to qualify an individual as a child care provider, notwith-
standing a criminal conviction, except as provided in section 110-
91(8).3" Similarly, a disqualified employee will also be notified, and a
criminal history that disqualifies an employee is reasonable cause for
the child care facility to deny continued employment.34
In addition to its role in the initial approval or disapproval of child
care providers for employment, the Department has ongoing over-
sight over the operation of the child care facilities. Following the issu-
ance of a license or temporary license to operate, the Department has
the authority to conduct inspections of child care facilities. Inspections
consist of the initial inspection visit (which cannot occur until the child
care facility administrator receives prior notice of the initial inspection
visit), and planned visits to all facilities, including announced and
unannounced visits (which are normally confidential). A visit without
notice can take place where there is probable cause to believe an
29. A formal procedure would comport with the paramount interest of protecting the chil-
dren, and the significant interest in ensuring that any prospective child care provider is treated
fairly and not disqualified arbitrarily.
30. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2701(d) (June 2000) (Sept. 2001 Supp.).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110.86 (6) (1999).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(c) (1999).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(8) (1999). Providing that
no person shall be an operator of nor be employed in a child care facility who has been
convicted of a crime involving child neglect, child abuse, or moral turpitude, or who is an
habitually excessive user of alcohol or who illegally uses narcotic or other impairing drugs,
or who is mentally or emotionally impaired to an extent that may be injurious to children.
Id. Therefore, a person convicted of one of the aforementioned crimes is barred from serving as
a child care provider by statute, with the Division having the discretion to qualify or disqualify
an individual based upon any other conviction, including those listed in section 110-90.2.
34. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2701(e), (f) (June 2000).
8
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emergency situation exists, or there is a complaint alleging violation of
licensure law, including but not limited to a report of child abuse or
neglect. 35 The protection of children in the most vulnerable circum-
stances is most deserving of protection from abusive and neglectful
care providers or others who may take advantage of their condition.
Inspections of facilities when there is an allegation of abuse or neglect
is but one way of protecting children during the early years of life.36
Abuse and neglect allegations are investigated by the Department,
and if the Department substantiates that child abuse or neglect has
occurred in a child care facility, the Department may issue a written
warning specifying the corrective action to be taken. A failure to
comply with the Department's directive may result in a provisional
license being issued for no more than six months. The Department
may take appropriate action to correct the situation, including the
permanent removal of the substantiated abuser or neglecter from the
premises, or the administration of other available statutory
remedies.37
A child is abused when the child is less than eighteen years of age
and suffers serious physical injury by other than accidental means, or
when grossly inappropriate devices are used to modify behavior. Any
person who commits, permits, or encourages the commission of a vio-
lation of the enumerated statutes is guilty of abuse or neglect. Addi-
tionally, a person who creates a condition causing serious emotional
damage, including severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or aggres-
sive behavior, is also guilty of abuse or neglect. 38 Any person who is
substantiated as an abuser or neglecter of children is entered into the
Central Registry on Child Abuse and Neglect as mandated by federal
and state law.
Selected statistical data is regularly maintained in the Central
Registry, including the number of children abused or neglected. Ad-
ditionally, the type of abuse or neglect, the age of the victim, the race
and gender of the person accused of abuse or neglect, and the rela-
tionship of the perpetrator to the child are also maintained. In 1999-
2000, the most recent year for which Central Registry Statistical Data
is available, the Department reported that 37,611 children were sub-
stantiated as having been abused or neglected. A similar number of
children were reported to have suffered abuse or neglect in 1998-
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-105(a)(1)-(3) (1999).
36. See supra note 1 for statutory language indicating the legislative intent and purpose. In
fact, the underlying purpose of section 110-85, et. seq., is to protect children receiving day care,
and to ensure that children receive care in a safe environment by persons of good moral
character.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-105.2 (1999).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101 (1999).
2001]
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1999. During this period, 36,674 children were abused or neglected.
Similarly, during 1997-1998, 34,201 children were substantiated as hav-
ing been abused or neglected, and in 1996-1997, 32,678 children were
substantiated as abused or neglected, and for 1995-1996, the number
of children substantiated as abused or neglected was 30,340. 3 ' During
each of the past five years, over 96,000 incidents of abuse or neglect
were reported.n
The number of children reported and substantiated as having been
abused or neglected in this state in the past five years is indeed star-
tling. While the overwhelming majority, or 80-85% of children sub-
stantiated as abused or neglected, suffered the abuse or neglect at the
hand of a biological parent,4 ' the number of children suffering abuse
or neglect outside of the parent/child relationship is nonetheless sig-
nificant. For example, the total number of children abused or ne-
glected in the combined categories of "other than parent or relative
Caretaker," "institution," and "day care facility" is 1,511 children dur-
ing 1995-96; 1,585 during 1996-97; 1,738 during 1997-98; 2,169 during
1998-99; and 2,165 during 1999-2000. The "day care facility/plan"
yielded numbers for 1995-1995 of 257; 1996-1997 of 362; 1997-1998 of
432; 1998-1999 of 498; and 1999-2000 of 508 children.42
During the 1995 legislative session, when the North Carolina Senate
proposed section 114-19.5, which requires a criminal record check for
day care providers, subsection (d) of the bill provided that the Legisla-
tive Research Commission was to study the use of records in the Cen-
tral Registry on Child Abuse and Neglect as part of the process of
conducting records checks of child care providers. Additionally, as
part of its study, the Commission was to evaluate current procedures
for substantiating claims of child abuse or neglect, and for maintaining
records in the Central Registry, and then determine what procedures
should be implemented to: (1) ensure that records are accurate; (2)
provide appropriate notice to interested parties; (3) provide for ex-
pungement or correction of information; and (4) provide for the re-
lease of information.43 Subsection(d), however, was not included in
39. See http://childrenservices.dhhs.state.us. . ._and-planning/programstatistics/index.htm.




43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-19.5 (1999). Article 2 of Chapter 114 of the General Statutes is
amended by adding a new section to read:
§ 114-19.5. Criminal Records Check of Child Care Providers.
The Department of Justice may provide to the Division of Child Development, Department of
Human Resources, the criminal history from the State and National Repositories of Criminal
Histories in accordance with G.S. 110-90.2, of any child care provider, as defined in G.S. 110-
90.2. The Division shall provide to the Department of Justice, along with the request, the
10
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the final version of the statute that was ratified by the General
Assembly.
Consequently, the Central Registry information is not available as a
record check component of the child care provider's application pro-
cess.44 Thus, a viable method of identifying substantiated abusers and
neglecters is not currently available to employers or the Department.
The Department has a substantial interest in ferreting out those indi-
viduals who may pose a danger to children, or who otherwise do not
possess the requisite moral character to qualify as child care provid-
ers.45 Therefore, the effectiveness of the statute is called into question
by the omission of a mechanism that would assist in identifying per-
sons who are not suitable candidates as child care providers.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE STATUTE
North Carolina law requires that a criminal history check be con-
ducted on all persons who provide child care in a licensed child care
facility, and on all persons providing child care in non-licensed child
care homes that receive state or federal funds.46 We can assume, with-
fingerprints of the provider to be checked, any additional information required by the Depart-
ment of Justice, and a form consenting to the check of the criminal record and to the use of
fingerprints and other identifying information required by the State or National Repositories
signed by the child day care provider to be checked. The Division shall keep ll information
pursuant to this section privileged, as provided in G.S. 110-90.2(e). The Department of Justice
shall charge a reasonable fee only for conducting the checks of the national criminal history
records authorized by the section. (Emphasis original)
(c) the North Carolina Child Care Commission shall adopt rules to implement this section,
in consultation with the Division of Child Development and Social Services of the Depart-
ment of Human Resources, and the Division of Criminal Information of the Department of
Justice.
(d) The Legislative Research Commission shall study the issue of using the records in the
Central Registry on Child Abuse and Neglect for the purpose of conducting records checks
of child day care providers. In its study, the Commission shall evaluate current procedures
for substantiating claims of child abuse or neglect and for maintaining records in the Central
Registry, and shall determine what procedure should be implemented to (i) ensure that
records are accurate, (ii) provide appropriate notice to interested parties, (iii) provide for
expungement or correction of information, and (iv) provide for release of information. The
Commission shall report its findings and recommendation to the 1997 General Assembly.
(e) Subsection (d) of this section is effective upon ratification. The remainder of this sec-
tion becomes effective January 1, 1996, and as defined in this section, applies to all child day
care providers providing child day care employment, and to all child day care providers
newly owning or operating child day care, on or after that date.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-311 (1999).
45. See supra note 1.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(c) (1999). The referenced statement is actually included in
the "Notice" provision of the statute. Therefore, each person submitting an application as a
child care provider is given notice of the requirement of the criminal history check. Addition-
ally, the statute states that "Criminal History" includes county, state, and federal convictions or
pending indictment of any of the following crimes: the following Articles of Chapter 14 of the
General Statutes: Article 6, Homicide: Article 7A, Rape and Kindred Offenses; Article 8, As-
saults; Article 10, Kidnapping and Abduction; Article 13, Malicious Injury or Damage by use of
11
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out proof to the contrary, that each child care provider submits the
requisite forms to the Department to facilitate the criminal history
check.47 It is what happens to the documentation once submitted that
has the potential to eviscerate or render the statute vacuous.
The process of determining the qualifications of a prospective child
care provider after receipt of the criminal records check documenta-
tion presents a two-fold scenario for consideration. The first scenario
involves an applicant who has been convicted of a potentially disquali-
fying criminal offense, and the Department is, or should be, aware of
the same upon receipt of the local record check. The second scenario
involves an applicant who relocated to the state, had a disqualifying
conviction out of state, and the local record check does not indicate a
criminal conviction. In either scenario, the applicant is allowed to ac-
cept conditional employment until the record check is processed and
returned to the Department.4 s One might presume that the scenario
involving the local conviction, where this information is provided to
the Department at the time of application, would warrant swift action
by the Department to qualify or disqualify the child care provider.
On the contrary, neither the statute, nor rules promulgated by the
Commission, mandate a given period of time for a determination of
qualification by the Department after submission of an application.49
During 1997, information provided to potential operators of child care
facilities indicated that the criminal records background check could
take from 90 to 120 days to determine qualifications.5" The May 2000
supplement to the Criminal Record Check(CRC) procedure does not
indicate the amount of time necessary to determine qualifications fol-
Explosive or Incendiary Device or Material; Article 26, Offenses Against Public Morality and
Decency; Article 40, Prostitution; Article 39, Protection of Minors: Article 40, Protection of
Family; and Article 59, Public Intoxication; violation of the North Carolina Controlled Substance
Act, Article 5 of Chapter 90 of the General Statutes, and alcohol-related offenses such as sale to
underage persons in violation of section 18B-302 or driving while impaired in violation of section
20-138.1 through section 20-138.5; or similar crimes under federal law or under the laws of other
states.
47. A failure to comply with the requirements of submitting the necessary information to
allow the processing of the criminal record check is a violation of the law. The Department has
at its disposal Administrative Penalties, section 110-102.2; Criminal Penalties, section 110-103;
Civil Penalties, section 110-103.1, and Injuctive Relief, section 110-104, all designed to ensure
compliance.
48. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2701(b) (June 2000) (Sept. 2001 Supp.).
49. See supra notes, 22 and 23. The Division must notify the child day care provider in
writing of the determination by the Division of the individual's fitness to have responsibility for
the safety and well-being of children based on the criminal history. In addition, the division
must notify the employer in writing of the Division's determination concerning the child day
care provider; however, the employer shall not be told the specific information used in making
the determination. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(e) (June 2000).
50. Division of Child Development, Criminal Records Background Checks Instructions for
Potential Owners/Operators of Licensed Child Day Care Facility (April 1997).
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lowing submission of the application documents.5' In actuality, the
determination of qualification after submission of the pertinent docu-
ments to the Department may take more than a year.
Long v. Dep't of Health and Human Services52 is illustrative of the
Department's delay in determining the qualifications of an applicant
with a local criminal history. In November of 1997, Mr. Long submit-
ted a local record check to the Department through his employer, as
required by statute, after being employed as a cook at a day care
center. The record check indicated that he was convicted of a crime
other than a minor traffic violation in 1987. Moreover, the local re-
cord indicated that Mr. Long was convicted of a felony. On January
27, 1999, the Department notified Mr. Long that he was disqualified
as a child care provider. Mr. Long did not have any convictions other
than the one reflected in the local records check. It is inexplicable
why the Department waited thirteen months to act on his application
as a child care provider.5 3 Other jurisdictions with similar statutes,
and with similar legislative purposes, have addressed this issue.
A. California
California has a statute5 4 that is substantially similar to the statute
that is currently in effect in North Carolina. Pursuant to California's
statute, a permanent set of fingerprints must be submitted to the De-
partment of Justice by the licensee. Within fourteen calendar days
of the receipt of the fingerprints, the Department of Justice must no-
tify the State Department of Social Services of the criminal record
information. If no criminal record information has been recorded, the
Department of Justice must provide the licensee and the State De-
partment of Social Services with a statement of that fact within four-
teen days of receipt of the fingerprints.56 Thus, both the licensee/
applicant and the Department responsible for determining qualifica-
51. Division of Child Development, Green Sheet, Criminal Records Background Checks
supplemental Instructions (May 2000).
52. Long v. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 548 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
53. I became familiar with the statute under consideration here in my capacity as Clinical
Director and Supervising Attorney supervising third-year law students. One of my students con-
ducted the initial interview of Mr. Long at North Central Legal Assistance Program (Legal Ser-
vices). Mr. Long sought help filing a civil case in Durham County District Court. An individual
who is potentially dangerous to children should not be around children for approximately thir-
teen months. Therefore, where a prospective child care provider has a local criminal record, the
Department certainly could, and should, make a determination regarding the applicant's qualifi-
cations within a reasonable time. A determination based on the local record check within four-
teen (14) to thirty (30) days is reasonable, a thirteen-month delay provides serious cause for
concern.
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 1596.871 (2000).
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tion will know of the applicant's status and fitness as a child care pro-
vider based on the criminal record check within fourteen calendar
days. Any violation of the statute is met with an immediate $100.00
civil penalty.57
B. Kentucky
The State of Kentucky requires all conviction information for any
applicant for employment from the Justice Cabinet prior to employing
the applicant.58 However, the Kentucky legislation provides that op-
erators of child care centers may employ persons convicted of sex
crimes classified as a misdemeanor at their discretion. Therefore, the
complete ban only applies to felony convictions.59
C. Oregon, Ohio and Illinois
Oregon 60 , Ohio61 , and Illinois 62 have statutes similar to North Car-
olina's, where the applicant may commence working as a child care
provider on a probationary or conditional basis pending receipt of the
criminal record check. However, in Illinois the newly hired employee
is not allowed to be alone with children until the results of the crimi-
nal record check have been received.63 Unlike the North Carolina
statute, the Illinois statute provides that persons who have committed
certain crimes may not be employed in a child care facility pending
receipt and approval of the criminal records check.64 Additionally,
the Illinois statute requires each applicant seeking licensure or qualifi-
cation as a child care provider to certify under penalty of perjury that
she is not more than thirty days delinquent in complying with a child
support order.65
D. Idaho
Idaho legislation, which has a records procedure similar to that of
North Carolina, provides for a temporary certification pending the
outcome of the criminal records check.66 However, Idaho's statute
57. CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 1596.871(c)(1)(C) (2000).
58. Ky. REV. STAT. § 119.896(19) (Michie 2001 Supp.).
59. Id.
60. OR. REV. STAT. § 657A.030(6)(b) (1997).
61. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.012(B)(2) (Anderson 2000).
62. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 408.40(b) (1997).
63. Id.
64. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 408.40(c) (1997).
65. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 408.40(e) (1997).
66. IDAHO CODE § 16.06.02.300(10)(a) (Michie 2000).
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provides that the temporary certification shall not exceed 120 days,
unless otherwise extended by the overseeing department.67
If the express purposes of its statute are to be realized, North Caro-
lina must adopt a statute similar to California's, under which the De-
partment would have access to the criminal records check outcome,
and make a determination of qualifications as a child care provider,
within a specified time of receipt of the requisite forms from the
applicant.
III. A CROSS-CHECK OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT REGISTRY
IS RECOMMENDED
Presently, no provision exists for checking the Central Registry for
Child Abuse and Neglect for the identity of current or prospective
child care providers as a part of the record check procedures required
by statute and Commission rules. The Department of Health and
Human Services is required by statute to maintain the Central Regis-
try,68 and "to compile data for appropriate study of the extent of
abuse and neglect within the state ... for its use for study and research
.... "69 The Department compiles data furnished by county directors
of social services to the Department of Health and Human Services,
and each year the Division produces summary statistics from the Cen-
tral Registry regarding child abuse and neglect in North Carolina.
The Division has taken care to ensure that the data is focused on un-
duplicated counts of maltreated children. Files are maintained con-
sisting of one page for each of the 100 counties in North Carolina. To
help understand the data, files contain county levels and state totals.
Each county is designated as level one, two or three based on
county population, providing a basis for comparison between coun-
ties.7 ° The Division is divided into seven teams. The Policy and Plan-
ning Team is responsible for managing the Central Registry for Child
Abuse and Neglect.71 The available data does not include the names
or identification information of perpetrators of child abuse or neglect.
Nevertheless, it seems the task of compiling the name, date of birth
and social security number of a perpetrator or substantiated abuser
67. IDAHO CODE § 16.06.02.300(10)(a)(i) (Michie 2000).
68. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-311 (1999).
69. Id.
70. Unduplicated Central Registry Statistics, at http//childrensservices.dhhs.state.nc.us/pol-
icy-and-planning/programstatistics/index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2001). The data is provided
for years 1996-1997 through 1999-2000, including all investigative assessments and children sub-
stantiated as having been abused or neglected for each county, the state, and county comparison
tables for the rates as a ratio of total county child population.
71. Policy and Planning, at http://Childrensservices.dhhs.state.nc.us/policy-and-planning/in-
dex.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2001).
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would be rather ministerial. A number of other jurisdictions require
a check of the Abuse and Neglect or similar Registry in conjunction
with the criminal record check.72 The Central Registry for Abuse and
Neglect contains a wealth of information, and arguably would provide
a valuable tool for identifying and screening child care providers.
Although the Central Registry is an excellent screening tool, we
must be cognizant of the stigma associated with inclusion in the regis-
try, where that information is disclosed to the public. Section 7B-311
requires that data furnished to the Department shall be confidential.73
One method of using the data in the criminal record check procedure
and preserving the confidentiality of the identifying information, is to
permit the Department to conduct an internal review of Central Reg-
istry data concerning child care providers.74 The statute provides that
the information received through the criminal record check is not
public record. Rather, it is privileged information for the exclusive
use of the Department.75
Unlike Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Pro-
grams,76 Central Registry inclusion does not create such a community
opprobrium, 77 because only the Department has access to the infor-
72. See generally, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-78-602 (a)(1)(A) (Michie 1999) (requiring Cen-
tral Registry and criminal records checks of each "applicant" for a license to own or operate a
child day care facility); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 26-6-107(1)(a)(i)(C) (2000) ("[T]he rules shall re-
quire the criminal background check .... As part of said investigation, the state central registry
of child protection shall be accessed to determine whether the owner, applicant, employee,
newly hired employee, licensee, or individual who resides in the licensed facility being investi-
gated is the subject of a report or known or suspected child abuse"); Wis. ADM. CODE Ch. HFS
12, Subch. III, App. A (2001); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. ch. 1240-4-1-.01-1240-4-1-.03 IV(iv)
(2001); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65C-16.007 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 16.06.02.300.09 (Michie
2000); ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 89, § 385.30 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 657A.030(3) (1999); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 170-E:7(II) (1999); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.903(1) (1999); and Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-20-8(3) (2000).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-311 (1999).
74. In Petition of Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d 590 (N.H. 1998), the New Hampshire Supreme
Court addressed the issue of applying the probable cause standard in any hearing to determine
registration in the Central Registry based on allegations of child sexual abuse. The court ac-
knowledged that to enter petitioner's name into central registry essentially barred him from
working with children, and caused him to become unemployed and unemployable in his profes-
sion, and thus his interest in his profession was a protected liberty interest under New Hamp-
shire Constitution.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(e) (1999).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5 (1999). The sex offender and public registration programs,
commonly referred as Megan's Law, have come under scrutiny because of the registration and
community notification requirements. A number of recent cases have addressed the issues
raised by these programs. See generally, Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d
1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Doe v. Pataki, 940 F.Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), and articles cited infra note
77.
77. See generally, Wayne Logan, A Study in "Actuarial Justice": Sex Offender Classification
Practice and Procedure, 3 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593 (2000); Mary-Marsh Porter Loe, Comment,
Arkansas Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Laws: An Ex Post Facto Violation? Ark.
Code Ann. §§ 12-12-901 to -20 and Synder v. State of Arkansas, 53 ARK. L. REV. 176 (2000).
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mation. Additionally, the Department's internal cross-check of the
Central Registry pursuant to the criminal record check procedure
would not have a community notification requirement as required by
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification laws. 78 As a result, the
confidentiality of the information is maintained and the purpose of
the statute is furthered by screening out child care providers who may
be harmful to children.
IV. THE STATUTE'S IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING THE RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
CHILD CARE PROVIDERS
Section 110-90.2 was enacted in 1995 and became effective January
1, 1996.79 Therefore, analysis of the statute's implications concerning
the rights, privileges and responsibilities of child care providers in-
volves convictions occurring before and after January 1, 1996. The
statute on its face does not proscribe, or require, retroactive applica-
tion. However, the general rule in North Carolina is that a statute will
be given prospective effect only, unless the law in question clearly for-
bids such a construction.80
It is not surprising that the anti-retroactivity principle finds expres-
sion in several provisions of the United States Constitution. The ex
post facto clause expressly prohibits retroactive application of penal
legislation. Additionally, the United States Constitution prohibits
states from passing laws "impairing the Obligation of Contracts. 81
Moreover, prohibitions on Bills of Attainder prohibit legislation that
singles out disfavored persons and metes out summary punishment for
past conduct.82 The Due Process Clause also protects the interests of
fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legisla-
tion; a justification sufficient to validate a statute's prospective appli-
cation under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive
application.83 Thus, section 110-90.2, applied retroactively, raises con-
cerns with respect to all persons who may be impacted by such an
application. The primary focus here, however, is on a person's dis-
78. See generally, Wayne Logan, A Study in "Actuarial Justice": Sex Offender Classification
Practice and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593 (2000); Mary-Marsh Porter Loe, Comment,
Arkansas Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Laws: An Ex Post Facto Violation? Ark.
Code Ann. §§ 12-12-901 to -20 and Synder v. State of Arkansas, 53 ARK. L. REV. 176 (2000).
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(b) (1999). ("Effective January 1, 1996, the Department-
shall ensure that the criminal history of all child care providers is checked and a determination is
made of the child care provider's fitness to have responsibility for the safety and well-being of
children based on the criminal history.").
80. Corp. of Elizabeth City v. Comm'r of Pasquotank, 60 S.E 416 (N.C. 1908).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl..
82. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
83. See id., citing Unsery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17 (1976).
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qualification as a child care provider resulting from convictions that
occurred prior to the date of the statute's enactment.
A. Ex Post Facto Clause Violation Analysis
A cogent argument can be made that any conviction occurring
before the statute was enacted cannot be used to disqualify a child
care provider since disqualification for a conviction that occurred
before the enactment would be giving the statute retroactive effect.
This would, in turn, violate the ex post facto Clause of the United
States Constitution84 and the North Carolina Constitution.85 Prohibi-
tions against ex post facto laws date as far back as ancient Greece. As
Justice Scalia has explained, "the presumption against retroactive leg-
islation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal
doctrine centuries older than our Republic."86 The United States
Constitution mandates that "[n]o state shall ... pass any . . .ex post
facto Law."8 7  The North Carolina Constitution provides that,
"[R]etrospective laws, punishing acts committed before the existence
of such laws and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, un-
just, and incompatible with liberty, and therefore no ex post facto law
shall be enacted."88 An ex post facto law is a law passed after the
occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively
changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. An
ex post facto law also is defined as a law which aggravates a crime or
makes it greater than when it was committed or a law that changes the
punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when it was committed.8 9
The United States Supreme Court defines an ex post facto law as
one which "punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which
was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punish-
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cli.
85. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 16.
86. Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prod-
ucts, 511 U.S. 244, 265 n.17 (1994) (qouting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno,
494 U.S. 827, 842-44, 855-56 (1990) (Scalia, J. concurring)). In Kaiser Aluminum, Justice Scalia
wrote:
The principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law
that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal. It was
recognized by the Greeks, see 2P. Vinogradofff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence 139-
140 (1922), by the Romans, see Justinian Code, Book 1, Title 14, § 7, by English common
law, see 3 H. Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 531 (T. Twiss trans. 1880);
Smead, 20 Minn.L.Rev., at 776-778, and the Code Napoleon, I Code Napolean, Prelim.
Title, Art. I, cl. 2 (B. Barrett trans. 1811). It has long been a solid foundation of American
Law.
Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 855.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
88. N.C. CONSr. art. I, § 16.
89. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (6th ed. 1990).
18
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 [2001], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol24/iss1/6
THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES
ment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged
with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when
the act was committed."9 Pursuant to the North Carolina Constitu-
tion, the ex post facto clause applies only to criminal statutes, that is,
to legislative, and not judicial action.9
The statute under consideration is a legislative enactment, and in
order for the enactment to be considered ex post facto, two critical
elements must be present: (1) it must apply to events occurring before
its enactment; and (2) it must disadvantage the offender affected by
it.9 2 However, the analysis does not end with a finding that the of-
fender is disadvantaged by the legislation since the statute under con-
sideration, if a sanction at all, is a civil sanction. A civil sanction
disqualifying a child care provider will implicate ex post facto concerns
only if it can fairly be characterized as punishment.93 The mark of an
ex post facto -law is the imposition of what can fairly be designated
punishment for past acts. The question in each case where unpleasant
consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior con-
duct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for
past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about
as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation, such as
the proper qualification for a profession.94
It follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to
serve a remedial purpose, but rather can also be explained as serving
either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have
come to understand the term.95 In the most basic terms, punishment
is, in the context of the justice system, the imposition of a penalty-a
suffering in right, person, or property-for the commission of a
crime.96
An applicant who has been convicted of a disqualifying offense is
punished by the enacted legislation by being denied the right to earn a
livelihood as a child care provider. The Division may disqualify a
child care provider pursuant to the statute after receiving information
indicating a conviction for any of the enumerated statutory offenses.97
A determination by the Division that a prospective child care provider
is disqualified because of a past conviction provides reasonable cause
90. In re Hayes, 432 S.E.2d 862, 865 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), appeal dismissed, 436 S.E.2d 376
(N.C. 1993), citing Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-170 (1925).
91. N.C. CONST. § 16, and Editor's Note (1999).
92. In re Hayes, 432 S.E.2d at 865-66.
93. United States v. Harper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989).
94. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960).
95. Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1995), citing, Harper, 490 U.S. at 447-49.
96. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 854 (1994) (Blackmum, J. concurring).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(a)(3) (1999).
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to deny issuance of the permit to operate as a child care provider.98
The employment of any child care provider determined by the Divi-
sion to be disqualified shall be terminated by the facility or small day
care home immediately upon receipt of the disqualification notice. 99
Since the statute, as written, does not provide for any time frame for
consideration of past convictions, it arguably is in violation of the ex
post facto clause of the United States and North Carolina Constitu-
tions, where the conviction occurred before the statute was enacted
and the disqualification is determined to be punishment.10
In Cummings v. Missouri, the United States Supreme Court stated
that:
the theory upon which our political institutions rest is that all men
have certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness; and that in the pursuit of happiness, all avo-
cations, all honors, all positions, are alike open to every one; and that,
in the protection of these rights, all are equal before the law. Any
deprivation or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is
punishment, and can be in no other wise defined. 10 1
In Ex parte Garland, the Supreme Court reviewed an act of Con-
gress which required that, among other things, a certain oath be taken
as a condition to the right to appear and be heard as an attorney pre-
viously admitted to the bar. The Court, referring to certain clauses of
the act relating to past conduct, found that:
[t]he statute is directed against parties who have offended in any of
the particulars embraced by these clauses. And its object is to exclude
them from the profession of the law, or at least from its practice in the
courts of the United States. As the oath prescribed cannot be taken by
these parties, the act, as against them, operates as a legislative decree
of perpetual exclusion. An exclusion from any of the professions or
any of the ordinary vocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in
no other light than as punishment for past conduct. The exaction of the
oath is the mode provided for ascertaining the parties upon whom the
act is intended to operate, and instead of lessening, increases, its ob-
jectionable character. All enactments of this kind partake of the na-
ture of bills of pains and penalties, and are subject to the
constitutional inhibition against the passage of bills of attainder, under
which general designation they are included. In the exclusion which
the statute adjudges, it imposes a punishment for some of the acts
specified which were not punishable at the time they were committed;
and for other of the acts it adds a new punishment to that before pre-
scribed, and it is thus brought within the further inhibition of the con-
98. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(f) (June 2000).
99, N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(g) (June 2000).
100. See Loe, supra note 77, at 176.
101. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 321 (1866).
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stitution against the passage of an ex post facto law.' 0 2 (Emphasis
added).
A statement that a statute will become effective on a certain date
does not suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at
an earlier date.103 The Supreme Court, in Landgraf v. USI Film Prod-
ucts, held that provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 creating the
right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for certain viola-
tions of Title VII and providing for trial by jury if such damages are
claimed, do not apply to Title VII cases pending on appeal when the
statute was enacted. In Landgraf, the Court stated that in order to
resolve the question left open by Congress, federal courts have la-
bored to reconcile two seemingly contradictory statements found in its
discussions concerning the effect of intervening changes in the law.
Each statement is framed as a generally applicable rule of interpreting
statutes that do not specify their temporal reach. 104 The first rule of
interpretation holds that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the
time it renders its decision." ''"5 The second rule is the axiom that
"[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law," and its interpretive corollary
is that legislative "[e]nactments and administrative rules will not be
construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result."' 106
Section 110-90.2 does not evince any clear expression of intent to
operate retroactively as applied to prior convictions, cases pending,
acts, or other conduct which occurred prior to the enactment of the
statute. An apparent tension exists between the rules espoused by the
United States Supreme Court for handling similar problems in the
absence of an instruction from Congress.
The better rule is the one espoused in Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hospital, in which Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion stated that
there exists a judicial presumption, of great antiquity, that a legislative
enactment affecting substantive rights does not apply retroactively ab-
sent clear statement to the contrary."1 7 It is further reiterated in Kai-
ser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, where Justice Scalia,
again, concurring, stated that he:
[w]ould... reaffirm the clear rule of construction that has been ap-
plied, except for these last two decades of confusion, since the begin-
102. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 337 (1866). See also, Hawker v. People of New
York, 170 U.S. 189, 203 (1898) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
103. Landgraf v. USI Flim Products, 511 U.S. 244, n. 10 (1994), citing Jensen v. Gulf Oil
Refining & Marketing Co., 623 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1980) and Sikora v. American Can Co.,
622 F.2d 1116, 1119-1124 (3rd Cir. 1980).
104. Id.
105. Id., citing Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1976).
106. Id.
107. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
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ning of the Republic and indeed since the early days of the common
law: absent specific indication to the contrary, the operation of non-
penal legislation is prospective only."'
108
The general rule in North Carolina is in accord with Landgraf and
Bonjorno. °9 The rules of statutory construction in North Carolina do
not suffer the tension created by Bradley and Georgetown Univ. Hos-
pital. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Corporation of Eliza-
beth City v. Commissioners of Pasquotank County, held that
it is an elementary rule of construction that a statute will not be de-
clared to be retroactive, unless it was clearly intended so to be, and
especially where such a construction would take away rights acquired
under a former law, even though the Legislature would have the con-
stitutional power to thus divest them.
[In North Carolina] courts will not give to a law a retrospective opera-
tion, even where they might do so without violation of the Constitu-
tion, unless the intention of the Legislature is clearly expressed in
favor of such retrospective operation. Except in the case of remedial
statutes and those which relate to procedure in the courts, it is a gen-
eral rule that acts of the Legislature will not be so construed as to
make them operate retrospective, unless the Legislature has explicitly
declared its intention that they should so operate, or unless such inten-
tion appears by necessary implication from the nature and words of
the act so clearly as to leave no room for a reasonable doubt on the
subject. 110 (Emphasis added)
Arguably, the Legislature intends to protect children from individu-
als deemed dangerous or not of good moral character. Thus, to the
extent that a conviction is evidence of dangerousness or bad character,
it is immaterial when the conviction occurred. This intention may be
viewed as a necessary implication of the statute.
"In the case of remedial legislation, the general rule is not as insis-
tent, and such statutes are not infrequently given retrospective effect
where the language permits and where such a construction will best
promote the intent of the legislature."11' This statute, arguably reme-
dial in nature, has not been the subject of an opinion in North Caro-
lina's appellate courts. Therefore, we are left to rely on the previous
holdings of the North Carolina appellate courts, the United States Su-
preme Court, and the federal courts for guidance.
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals
should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform
108. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 841 (1990) (Scalia, J.
concurring).
109. See supra notes 75 and 104 and accompanying text.
110. Corp. of Elizabeth City v. Comm'r of Pasquotank, 60 S.E. 416, 417-18 (N.C. 1908).
111. Wadill v. Masten, 60 S.E. 694, 696 (N.C. 1916).
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their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly
disrupted.'12 The legislature has unmatched powers, and can sweep
away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized con-
sideration. The legislature's "responsivity to political pressures poses
a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means
of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals."' ' 3 The groups
or individuals adversely impacted by section 110-90.2 are those with
pending indictments or convictions of a crime, including felonies and
misdemeanors. It could easily be a situation where the crime was
committed, and the individual's debt was paid to society more than a
decade before the statute was enacted. 14 Therefore, if the legislature
is determined to alter settled expectations, then at a minimum, the
legislature should issue a "clear statement" in the text of the statute to
that end. In the alternative, because of the arguably remedial nature
of the statute, the statutory language needs to be consulted to deter-
mine whether retroactivity will best promote the meaning and pur-
pose of the legislature.
As a safeguard, it is important that the legislature first make its in-
tention clear. This will tend to ensure that the legislature has deter-
mined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for
disruption or unfairness. Statutory retroactivity has long been disfa-
vored.' 15 In Justice Story's view, the ban on retrospective legislation
embraces "all statutes, which, through operating only from their pas-
sage, affect vested rights and past transactions." '116 Justice Story elab-
orated by stating that
every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty,
or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considera-
tions already past, must be deemed retrospective."' 7 "Sound gui-
dance, in reaching a conclusion, is guided by principles of 'fair notice,'
'reasonable reliance,' and 'settled expectations.""
112. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, n.18 (1994), citing, General Motors
Corp v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) ("Retroactive legislation presents problems of unfair-
ness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it can deprive
citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions"); Munzer, A Theory of Retro-
active Legislation, 61 TEXAS L.REv. 425, 471 (1982) ("The rule of law ... is a defeasible entitle-
ment of persons to have their behavior governed by rules publicly fixed in advance"); see also, L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 51-62 (1964).
113. Landgraf, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
114. See supra note 52.
115. Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.N.H. 1814) (No.
13, 156).
116. Id.
117. Id., citing Calder v. Bull, 3 Dal. 386, 1 L.Ed 648 (1798).
118. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 244 (1994).
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Requiring a clear statement assures that the legislature itself has
affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive appli-
cation and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the
countervailing benefits." 9 Such a requirement allocates to the legisla-
ture responsibility for fundamental policy judgments concerning the
proper temporal reach of statutes, and has the additional virtue of giv-
ing legislators a predictable background rule against which to
legislate.' z
The "clear statement" rule is no less poignant where the statute is
deemed a remedial one. A remedial statute is defined as "a law that
affords a remedy" or "a law that is intended to correct, remove, or
lessen a wrong, fault or defect. 1 21 Further, a remedial statute is legis-
lation "that does not proscribe any conduct that was previously
legal."' 12
2
A review of section 110-90.2 requires an examination of Article 7 of
the North Carolina General Statutes, in which section 110-90.2 is
found. Criminal record check provisions, set out in section 110-90.2,
when considered within the larger context of Article 7, have both re-
medial and penal aspects. The remedial components are set out in
sections 110-85,123 110-90.2(b),124 and 110-91(8).125 The aforemen-
tioned sections arguably are remedial and presumably promote the
laudable purposes of the statute. For example, they ensure that
"[c]hildren are cared for by qualified persons of good moral charac-
ter,' 26 they provide for a "determination of the child care provider's
fitness to have responsibility for the safety and well-being of chil-
dren, ' 127 they provide "no person shall be an operator of nor be em-
ployed in a child care facility who ... may be injurious to children,' 12
and they are intended to ensure that "children in child care are cared
119. Id.
120. Id. C.F. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 200 (1898) (Dr. Hawker was convicted of
the crime of abortion, a felony, in 1878, and imprisoned for ten years. New York enacted a
statute in 1895 which provided that "any person after conviction of a felony, who practice[s] or
attempt[s] to practice medicine"shall be fined $250.00, or imprisoned for six months. During
April 1896, Dr. Hawker was indicted, alleging the 1878 conviction, as being in violation of the
statute when he practiced medicine during February 1896. The Defendant challenged this stat-
ute on the grounds that it violated the ex post facto clause. The judgment was affirmed on the
premise that disbarment for the practice of medicine was not a penalty, but as prescribing the
qualifications for the duties to be discharged and the position to be filled, and naming what is
deemed to be, and what is in fact, appropriate evidence of such qualifications. Id. at 200).
121. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (6th Ed. 1991).
122. Landraf 511 U.S. at 297 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-85 (1999).
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(b) (1999).
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(8) (1999).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-85(1) (1999).
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(b) (1999).
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(8) (1999).
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for by qualified people.' 29 If the examination were to end here, the
statute would be deemed constitutional, because "the presumption is
that the General Assembly's actions are correct and constitutional,
and a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless this conclu-
sion is so clear that no reasonable doubt can arise.130 However, the
examination does not end here.
The penal aspects of the statutory scheme must be examined to de-
termine if the statute is rendered defective as a result thereof. Section
110-98 mandates compliance with the statute, 131 and section 110-103
provides that any person who violates the enumerated provisions of
the statute is guilty of a crime.132 Additionally, any operator who vio-
lates any provision of Article 7 of the General Statutes may be levied
a civil penalty. 133
One means of determinating whether a statute violates the ex post
facto clause, is to ascertain whether the statute makes illegal an act
which was legal before the statute was enacted. The statutory scheme
of section 110-90.2 makes employing a child care provider who was
previously convicted of a statutorily enumerated crime illegal, an act
that was innocent before the statute was enacted. Additionally, a civil
penalty for violation of any provision in Article 7 disadvantages any
operator of a child care facility. Further, any person convicted of a
crime and employed by a child care facility and subsequently termi-
nated by the facility in compliance with the statute is disadvantaged by
the passage of the statute. 34
A counter argument that the statute is not an ex post facto law as it
relates to an operator is that an ex post facto law punishes a person for
his own past act which was legal when committed. Here, operators
are subjected to punishment for employing the person who committed
an act which was a crime when committed. Thus, the act now being
punished, is the act of employing, which is not a past act relative to
enactment of the statute. To this extent, the statute may be deemed a
criminal or punitive law, but not ex post facto, with respect to the
operator.
With respect to employees, however, as opposed to operators, the
statute arguably is ex post facto in that it increases the punishment for
an act committed by an employee before the enactment of the statute.
129. Id.
130. Mitchell v. Financing Authority, 159 S.E.2d 745 (N.C. 1968).
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-98 (1999).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-103 (1999).
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-103.1 (1999).
134. See generally, Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 291. (providing that "[miost statutes are meant to
regulate primary conduct, and hence will not be applied in trials involving conduct that occurred
before their effective date.")
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In this regard, it will be necessary to distinguish employees who com-
mitted a crime before the enactment of the statute from those who
committed a crime after its enactment. As Justice Story elaborated,
"every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty,
or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considera-
tions already past, must be deemed retrospective."' 135
Applying the foregoing principles to section 110-90.2, the statute is
in violation of the ex post facto clause if applied to individuals who
were convicted of an enumerated offense prior to January 1, 1996.
Two additional points merit mention concerning passage of a statute
which may be construed as being in violation of the ex post facto
clause. First, consider James Madison's prescient statement, expres-
sing concern that
[tihe sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy
which has directed public councils. They have seen with regret and
indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences in cases
affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and
influential speculators, and snares to the more industrious and less in-
formed part of the community.1 36
Further, "'bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the
obligation of contracts"' were "'contrary to the first principle of the
social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation." 137
Second, the statute takes no meaningful account of the character, at
the time of the Department's decision, of the person whose previous
conviction of a misdemeanor or felony is cause for disqualification as
a child care provider.'3 8 "The offender may have become, after con-
viction, a new man in point of character and so conduct himself as to
win the respect of his fellow men, and be recognized as one capable
... of doing great good.' 3 9
Additionally, being debarred from his chosen avocation interferes
with the offender's ability to rehabilitate. Proponents of the statute
may advocate that the offender gets what he deserves because he
committed the offense leading to the conviction.14 ° "[A] society, or a
legislature, may have a right to make that generalization as a matter of
social policy, but a statutory scheme built upon a presumption that an
135. Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.N.H. 1814) (No.
13, 156), citing, Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed 648 (1798).
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (McLean ed. 1961).
137. Id. See, also, Landgraf 511 U.S. at 268 n. 20.
138. See Hawker v. People of New York, 170 U.S. 189, 203 (1898).
139. Id. at 204 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
140. Doe v. Pataki, 940 F.Supp. 603, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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entire group of individuals is incapable of rehabilitation is fundamen-
tally punitive in nature."14 ' Moreover,
the ex post facto clause forbids all laws that increase punishment after
the fact; there is no exception for laws that are based on good inten-
tions or that seek to protect our children. If a law increases punish-
ment, it cannot be applied retroactively even if it would also prevent
further acts of violence and abuse. 4
2
Thus, section 110-90.2 violates both the United States and North Car-
olina Constitutions because of its retroactive application to convic-
tions that occurred before January 1, 1996.
B. Bill of Attainder Analysis
I do not conclude lightly that section 110-90.2 is unconstitutional as
a bill of attainder. Although the statute may be substantively lacking,
ill-suited to protect children receiving child care, and capable of ad-
versely impacting citizens previously convicted of a criminal offense,
the judiciary is loathe to find a legislative enactment unconstitutional.
In this regard, "it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people,"' 43 and, in this
instance, the guardians of our most cherished resource - our children.
However, the statute does raise the specter of punishment in the sepa-
ration of powers sense, to the extent it is applied retroactively, and
consequently is defective as written.
1. Historical Analysis
In Cummings v. State of Missouri1 44 , the United States Supreme
Court found that "[a] bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without a judicial trial. If the punishment is less than
death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the mean-
ing of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and
penalties." '145 Any statute enacted by the legislature, or rule promul-
gated pursuant to legislative authority, "that appl[ies] ...to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punish-
ment on them without trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the
Constitution. 146
Punishment is important to separation of powers, which ensures
that the legislature shall not punish individuals. It is undisputed that
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 319 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoting
Missouri K & T.R. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (year).
144. Cummings v. State of Missouri, 71 U.S.1 (4 Wall.) 227 (1866).
145. Id. at 323.
146. Lovet, 328 U.S. at 315.
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the legislature can set general standards, impose regulations, or estab-
lish qualifications. However, the judicial branch of government must
apply the standards, regulations or qualifications to a fact situation
that involves an individual. 47
In United States v. Lovett148, a landmark case illustrating the separa-
tion of powers aspect of punishment, Congress, through legislation,
sought to punish three federal employees because of their political
conduct by proscribing their employment as government employees.
The legislation was held to be a bill of attainder. Today, the prohibi-
tion against bills of attainder prevents any "legislative acts, no matter
what their form, that apply either to named individuals or easily ascer-
tainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial."' 49
Pursuant to Lovett, section 110-90.2 applies to an easily ascertaina-
ble group. The group is, quite simply, any child care provider or pro-
spective child care provider who has been convicted of a statutorily
enumerated offense. For purposes of this discussion, the group is di-
vided into a fixed group 150 (those convicted of a relevant offense prior
to January 1, 1996), and a shifting group 151 (anyone convicted of an
offense on or after January 1, 1996). The fixed group will occupy the
bulk of this discussion, because as related to the fixed group, whether
the statute is a bill of attainder is a closer question and the separation
of powers concerns are more important.
Once it is determined that a law identifies its subject with specific-
ity, the issue becomes whether the statute inflicts punishment as de-
fined by Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv. 152  Under Nixon,
whether a statute imposes a "punishment" under the Bill of Attainder
Clause depends on: (1) whether the challenged statute falls within the
historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute,
viewed in terms of the type and severity of the burdens imposed, can
reasonably be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes; and
(3) whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to
punish. 53
The historical meaning of legislative punishment includes the death
sentence, imprisonment, banishment, confiscation of property, and
147. See Note, Punishment: Its Meaning in Relation to Separation of Power and Substantive
Constitutional Restrictions and Its Use in the Lovett, Trop, Perez and Speiser Cases, 34 Ind. L.J.
231, 232 (1959); see also, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
148. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
149. Bell South Corporation v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 683 (1998), qouting Lovett, 328 U.S. at 315
(1946).
150. See Note, supra note 147, at 239.
151. Id.
152. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
153. Id. at 473, 475, 76.
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legislative bars to participation by individuals or groups in specific em-
ployment or professions. 54 Section 110-90.2 imposes a legislative bar
of employment to all persons specifically excluded by statute. 55 In
addition to the fixed group specifically barred by statute from em-
ployment as a child care provider, the legislature has delegated to the
Department the prerogative to disqualify any person who has been
adjudicated guilty of a statutorily enumerated misdemeanor or
felony. 156
As the writer correctly stated in Note, Punishment: Its Meaning in
Relation to Separation of Power and Substantive Constitutional Restric-
tion and Its use in the Lovett, Trop, Prez and Speiser Cases1 57 (herein-
after "Note, Punishment"), the Bill of Attainder Clause only prevents
legislative punishment and not merely regulation of a narrow group.
The problem of determining when the legislation constitutes punish-
ment is critical to finding bills of attainder.1 58
In Note, Punishment, two seventeenth century attainders were ex-
amined to aid analysis. In the first, it was decreed that the Earl of
Clarendon "should suffer perpetual exile and be forever banished
from the realm . . . ." In the second, the "attainder was against the
Earl of Kildare which said that 'all such persons which be or hereto-
154. Navegar, Inc. v. U.S., 192 F.3d 1050, 1066 (Cir. 1999). The court in Navegar quoted Bell
South 11, 162 F.3d at 683, as defining the modern bill of attainder analysis. Under the current
interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause, a law is constitutionally impermissible if it both
singles out individuals (or businesses) and imposes punishment on them. The Bill of Attainder
Clause has been one of the original guarantees of civil liberty, and has existed for over two
hundred years. However, the Supreme Court has relied upon it to strike down legislation only
five times. See U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437(1965); U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303; Pierce v. Car-
skadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). In Legislative Disqualitive As Bills of Attainder, 4
VAND. L. REV. 603 (1951), Professor Wormuth surmised that during the time the Constitution
was adopted, the term bill of attainder had not been given a precise definition. Justice Story
described the bill of attainder as
such special acts of the legislature as inflict capital punishment upon persons supposed to be
guilty of high offenses, such as treason and felony, without any conviction in the ordinary
court of judicial proceedings. If an act inflicts a milder degree of punishment than death, it
is called a bill of pains and penalties. But in the sense of the Constitution, it seems that bills
of attainder include bills of pains and penalties. In such cases, the legislature assumes judi-
cial magistracy, pronouncing on the guilt of the party without any of the common forms and
guards of trial, and satisfying itself with proof, when such proofs are within its reach,
whether they are conformable to the rules of evidence or not. In short, in all such cases, the
legislature exercise the highest power of sovereignty, and what may be properly deemed an
irresponsible despotic discretion, being governed solely by what it deems political necessity
or expediency, and too often under the influence of unreasonable fears or unfounded
suspicions.
2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1344 (5th ed., Bigelow, 1891).
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(8) (1999).
156. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(a)(3), (b) (1999).
157. Note, Punishment: Its Meaning in Relation to Separation of Power and Substantive Con-
stitutional Restrictions and Its Use in the Lovett, Trop, Perez and Speiser Cases, 34 IND. L.J. 231
(1959).
158. Id. at 238.
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fore have been.., confederated.. . in his false and traitorous acts and
purposes shall in likewise stand, and be attainted, adjudged, and con-
victed of high treason."" 59  These two illustrations help to make
group or class distinctions:
At the time it was passed the attainder of the Earl of Kildare bur-
dened a determinable group-'all such persons which be or heretofore
have been' allied with him. By its terms, the statute was retrospective.
This type of statute is labeled a disability, and the class which is bur-
dened is fixed. People fall within the classification because of activity
prior to the passage of the statute. Nothing they do now allows them
to remove themselves from the group to which the statute applies. If
the legislature intends to punish this fixed group, then it is attainder.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is a statutory qualification which
involves a shifting group. The statute is prospective, not retrospective.
Since future conduct is the test of membership in the statutory class,
the group is shifting. At the time the statute is enacted, the individual
who will suffer the burden of the statute cannot be known. 160 (Em-
phasis added).
The terms "disability," "fixed group" and "shifting group" will be
used to explain the application of section 110-90.2 to the groups im-
pacted by the statute.
2. Lovett, Nixon, Part I, Analysis
In reviewing the cases where the Supreme Court relied upon the
prohibition against bills of attainder to strike down the legislation161 ,
only United States v. Brown addressed a statute encompassing both a
"fixed" and "shifting" group.162 The fixed group in Brown consisted
159. Id. at 239.
160. Id.
161. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (statute prohibiting anyone who is or has been member of
communist party from holding union office was held to be a bill of attainder); Lovett, 328 U.S.
303 (bill naming and barring three government employees deemed to be subversive from all
future government employment held to be bill of attainder); Pierce v. Carskadon (statute deny-
ing attorneys access to the courts unless they attested under oath to lack of participation in
rebellion held to be bill of attainder); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 4 (Wall) 333 (1866) (held federal
statute requiring attorneys prior to admission in federal court to take an oath disavowing any
part in the rebellion to be bill of attainder); and Cummings v. Missouri (constitutional provision
forbidding persons to hold office or participate in certain avocation unless under oath they de-
nied participating in or being in sympathy with rebellion was bill of attainder).
162. In Brown, the Court struck down as a bill of attainder, 73 Stat. 536, 29 U.S.C. § 504
(1958 ed., Supp. IV) (hereinafter § 504), which statute provided, in pertinent part, that
no person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party ... shall serve ... as an
officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, busi-
ness agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee performing
exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization .. .[d]uring or for five
years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party.
29 U.S.C. § 504(a), (a)(1) (1958 ed., Supp.IV). In addition, § 504 held that "[a]ny person who
willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000.00 or imprisoned for not more
than one year or both. § 504(b).
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of the persons who had been a member of the Communist Party
within the preceding five years. At the time the statute became effec-
tive, there was nothing this group could do to purge themselves of the
disqualification. In this sense the statute was applied retroactively to
the fixed group. 163
The retroactive application of the statute to a fixed group is some
evidence of legislative intent to punish.
The important fact is that the group is fixed-that one became a mem-
ber of the burdened group not of choice, but because of legislative
fiat. A statute aimed at a narrow group should sensitize one to the
possibility of attainder, but that fact alone should not control the anal-
ysis .... That the burdened group is fixed is essential to attainder;
that it is small is possibly indicative of attainder. 164
The fact that section 110-90.2 is applied retroactively to a fixed
group, arguably small in number, can be inferred as evidence of intent
to punish. However, the statute may also be said to merely state qual-
ifications, which legitimately is a proper legislative function. In estab-
lishing qualifications, the legislature's obligation is to spell out
affirmative qualities which are implied in the activity to which admis-
sion is restricted. The legislature serves all members of society when it
establishes qualifications where the rights of all citizens are considered
and do not exclude any designated person or class of persons; all are
eligible to acquire the qualification.
Legislative establishment of qualifications, rules and regulations are
all proper. However, "the establishment of disabilities is another mat-
ter. Here the legislature does not confine itself to reciting the requi-
site virtues which serve as qualifications; it specifies a characteristic
which it declares to constitute a disqualification.' '1 65 This disqualifica-
tion speaks to the character of the person disqualified. A disqualify-
ing determination in this instance results from a legislative judgment
that the proscribed person possesses a bad character or a character
trait not found in people generally. It is a legislative determination,
judicial in nature, of culpability, blameworthiness, or a character trait
worthy of society's opprobrium.1 66 This sort of legislative action
163. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (In Douds, § 9h of the
National Labor Relations Act withstood challenge as a bill of attainder. However, one of the
significant differences between § 9h (Douds), and § 504 (Brown), is that § 9h did not punish
retroactively and the affected person could purge himself of the disqualification by terminating
his membership in the Communist Party. On the contrary, in § 504 the affected person who was
then a member of the Communist Party, could resign his membership, and then wait five years
before he could resume his position as an officer, trustee, director, etc.)
164. Note, supra note 147, at 243.
165. Wormuth, supra note 154, at 609.
166. Id. at 610.
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evinces a legislative intent to punish, and therefore, raises the specter
of separation of power concerns.
Finally, ascertaining the requisite legislative intent to punish for
purposes of bill of attainder analysis can be shown in two ways: (1) the
statute's express intent to punish, on the face of the statute or other
records; or (2) hidden intent. Section 110-90.2 does not, on its face or
in other records, express an intent to punish. However, the fact that
the statute is applied retroactively to a fixed group evinces a hidden
intent to punish. This is especially true where the offense is a misde-
meanor which has no relevancy to qualifications or moral character as
they relate to providing child care. Therefore, it would appear that
under the first part of Lovett (specifically singles out individuals or
fixed group), and the first part of Nixon (bar to participation in spe-
cific employment is punishment), the test is satisfied.
3. Lovett, Nixon, Part II, Analysis
The next question under Nixon is whether section 110-90.2, viewed
in terms of the type and severity of the burdens imposed, reasonably
can be said to further non-punitive purposes. This question "invaria-
bly appears to be the 'the most important of the three."" 67 First, the
statutory scheme's stated purpose is to "[p]rotect children in child
care facilities by ensuring that these facilities provide a physically safe
and healthy environment where ...these children are cared for by
qualified persons of good moral character.' 1 68 A determination is
made of the child care provider's "[f]itness to have responsibility for
the safety and well-being of children based on the criminal history."' 69
The legislative parens patriae interest is consistent with the statutory
scheme's stated purpose, and is a valid exercise of legislative discre-
tion. However, the criminal record check mandated by section 110-
90.2 does not speak to educational qualifications, work experience,
training, or past performance as a child care provider. The provision
only speaks to the disqualification, that is, unfitness as a child care
provider based on a defect of moral character.1 70 Second, the burden
imposed is similar to that proscribed in Lovett, where the Court held
the statute "'operates as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion'
from a chosen vocation. This permanent proscription... is punishment,
and of a most severe type.' 171
167. Bell South Corporation v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Bell South
Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-85(1) (1999).
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(b) (1999).
170. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-85 et seq (1999).
171. U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
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The statutory scheme operating through section 110-90.2 does that
which the bill of attainder clause forbids, namely, to inquire into a
person's character and to impose a disability as a result of its findings.
Therefore, if the statute is to be found constitutional, Hawker v. New
York,'1 72 and its progeny must be considered.'73  In Hawker, the
United States Supreme Court considered good character as a neces-
sary qualification for all who practiced medicine and relied upon a
felony conviction as evidence of bad character. In so finding, the
Court stated that "[t]he State is not seeking to further punish a crimi-
nal, but only to protect its citizens from physicians of bad character.
The vital matter is not the conviction, but the violation of law. The
former is merely the prescribed evidence of the latter.' 1 74 At first
glance, one might conclude that any disqualification predicated upon
a conviction of a crime will withstand challenge as bill of attainder
following Hawker.
However, the Hawker ruling is significant for a more important rea-
son. All statutes enacted following the Court's ruling in Hawker,
where a violation of the bill of attainder clause has been raised and
the statute was found to be a valid exercise of legislative authority,
have what may be referred to as the "notorious connection" 1 75 be-
tween the disqualification and the activity barred. 76 In Hawker, the
172. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1889).
173. See Wormuth, supra note 154, at 611-15.
174. Hawker, 170 U.S. at 196. See also, Wormuth, supra note 154, at 612.
In conformity with Hawker v. New York, it has been held that conviction of felony may be
made a disqualification for public office. Other statutes have carried the policy further.
New York has also disqualified dentists and veterinarians who have been convicted of fel-
ony. The Secretary of the Treasury is instructed not to license any person to deal in liquor
who has been convicted of felony within the past five years, or of a misdemeanor under any
federal law relating to liquor within three years. The Investment Company Act bars those
convicted of crimes in securities transactions from any connection with investment compa-
nies. Persons adjudged guilty of violating the antitrust laws by monopolizing or attempting
to monopolize radio communication are not eligible for licenses to construct or operate
radio stations. The Packers and Stockyards Act appears to be unique in that it requires no
judicial proceeding; the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to refuse a license to deal in
poultry if he finds that the applicant has engaged in any of the practices forbidden by the
Act within two years prior to his application. There is in each case a notorious connection
between the disqualification and the activity barred.
Id. at 612.
175. See Wormuth, supra note 166. Professor Wormuth first coined the phrase "notorious
connection" in Legislative Disqualification As Bills of Attainder, However, other courts have use
similar or synonymous language. See De Veau, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (relevant incident);
Dehainaut, 32 F.3d. 1066, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 1994) (adequate nexus); Siegel, 851 F.2d 412, 418
(D.C.Cir. 1998) (responsibly connected); Veg-Mix, 832 F.2d 601, 604 (D.C.Cir. 1987) (responsibly
connected). See also, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-119.6(d)(5) (providing that there exists a nexus
between a person's criminal history and the duties of the job for which she seeks employment).
176. See supra note 165. In addition to the cases referred to in Legislative Disqualifications,
see De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (much-needed scheme for regulation of water-
front prohibited convicted felons from being officers of a waterfront union did not violate the
bill of attainder clause); Dehainaut v Pena, 32 F.3d. 1066, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[w]e find an
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Court acknowledged that where there is reliance upon a conviction to
illustrate bad character "[i]n a certain sense such a rule is arbitrary,
but it is within the power of a legislature to prescribe the rule of gen-
eral application . ". . ."I" In Brown, the Court extended the rule of
general application. 178 More importantly, however, the Brown Court
held that Congress "[c]annot specify the people upon whom the sanc-
tion it prescribes is to be levied."' 79 Additionally, in BellSouth I, the
Court took pains to "[e]nsure that 'the nonpunitive aims of an appar-
ently prophylactic measure [are] sufficiently clear and convincing"'
before finding that the measure did not constitute a bill of
attainder. t8 o
The General Assembly delegated to the Department the authority
to disqualify child care providers pursuant to section 110-90.2, which
mandates a criminal history check. "'Criminal history' means the
county, state, or federal criminal history of convictions or pending in-
dictment of a crime, whether a misdemeanor or felony, that bears
upon an individual's fitness to have responsibility for the safety and
well-being of children as set forth in section 110-91(8). '' 1" (Emphasis
added)
Thus, unlike in Hawker, a child care provider may be disqualified
based upon a pending indictment, or a misdemeanor if the Depart-
ment determines the pending indictment or misdemeanor conviction
bears upon the individual's fitness. It is doubtful this statute, on its
face, can pass the Hawker "notorious connection" test. It is not suffi-
ciently "clear and convincing," pursuant to BellSouth I, what is actu-
ally delegated to the Department and what parameters are to guide
the Department's discretion. Thus, the statute fails the BellSouth I
test as well. Additionally, the statute is defective pursuant to Brown,
because it specifies the "fixed group" of people to whom it is applica-
ble. Again, this Article is primarily concerned with a conviction that
adequate nexus between the restriction imposed and the legitimate governmental purpose. Pres-
ident Reagan determined that the intermingling of controllers who had been fired for striking
with those who had replaced them would interfere with the safety and efficiency of the FAA's
operations."); Siegel v. Lyng, 851 F.2d 412, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (someone who was formerly
responsibly connected with a violator of the Act was barred from employment with another
licensee under the Act for one year); Veg-Mix, Inc. v. USDA, 832 F.2d 601, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(transaction by firms employing person reasonably connected to disciplined licen-
see... justification for the temporary bar.)
177. Hawker, 170 U.S. at 197.
178. U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461 (1965).
179. Id.
180. BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58,65 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (qouting LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-5, 655 (2d ed. 1998)).
181, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(3) (1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-91(8) (1999).
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occurred before passage of the statute. 8 2 Therefore, section 110-90.2
does not satisfy part two of the Nixon three-part test.183
The inclusion of a pending indictment as the basis of disqualifica-
tion provides a strong counter argument that the intent of the statute
is not to punish. Presumably, the legislature is aware that punishment
is never appropriate prior to conviction. Therefore, one could infer
that punishment is not the intent of the statute.
4. Lovett, Nixon Part III Analysis
The final question under Nixon is whether this statute evinces a leg-
islative intent to punish. 84 Attainder jurisprudence has evolved and
is no longer limited to an express statutory declaration of guilt. Two
separate methods of showing intent to punish have been developed.
One method is by demonstrating an express intent from the punitive
language of committee records, senate journals, and from floor de-
bate. A second method "is the concept of hidden intent which states
that although the statute may be entirely civil in form, because of its
effect, it punishes a fixed group." '185 If the effect of the statute is to
punish, it can be inferred that the statute was passed with hidden in-
tent. As was aptly pointed out in Note, Punishment quoting a state
judge in Starkweather v. Blair,86 "'how on the state level can one find
and prove an intent to punish? In Minnesota there are no records of
committee hearings. Furthermore, one can't look to extraneous evi-
dence not a part of the journal entry." 187 The observation regarding
the lack of state legislative records is as relevant today in North Caro-
lina as when Starkweather was decided. Therefore, an analysis of sec-
tion 110-90.2 must proceed under the "hidden intent" prong because it
is a state statute with a sparse legislative record.
182. Note, supra note 147, at 254, n.108 (1959) ("the mere presence of a prior conviction will
not alone sustain a subsequent disability that has no connection at all with present fitness. [A]
judicial conviction cannot be the exclusive basis of disability").
183. The statute, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, i.e., perpetual
exclusion, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes. The fact that one
can be disqualified because of an allegation of, without a finding of guilt, a misdemeanor assault,
public intoxication or driving while impaired that may have occurred some time in the distant
past appears to be inconsistent with the bill of attainder clause.
184. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473.
185. Note, supra note 147, at 249 n.90, citing, Starkweather v. Blair, 71 N.W. 2d 869, 875
(1955), (finding that "apparently the Lovett case is the first in which the court has gone beyond
the language of the act itself in seeking ... [the legislature's] motive. ")
186. Starkweather, 71 N.W.2d 869 (1955).
187. A search was made of the legislative records in the Legislative Library located in the
Legislative Office Building, 116 West Jones Street, Raleigh, North Carolina, and no minutes
regarding benefits or burdens of the legislation were found. We were able to ascertain the legis-
lation was part of a larger appropriations bill, and identify entries where funds were appropri-
ated for the purpose of carrying out the record checks.
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The "hidden intent" test provides that when a disability is based on
past conduct, and that conduct bears no relation to present qualifica-
tion, there is an attainder.'88 In this sense, when a statute such as
section 110-90.2 has "fixed" and "shifting" application, a prospective
(shifting) application constitutes a qualification, and a retrospective
(fixed) application constitutes a disability.'8 9 A legislative scheme ap-
plied retroactively to disqualify a child care provider constitutes a dis-
ability, and therefore, operates as a bill of attainder.
The bill of attainder clause forbids a process as well as an out-
come.1 9° The right to a full hearing ordinarily would sound the death
nell to legislation as a bill of attainder, that is, "the legislature punish-
ing a narrow group of individuals without a judicial trial."' 9 ' How-
ever, it is the process of review pursuant to section 110-90.2 that
arguably evinces "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent"' 92 to
punish child care providers previously convicted of a crime. The re-
view process of the Department's decision disqualifying a child care
provider is divided into three classes. Each class is treated differently
based upon the member's status as either operator/owner, employee,
or nonregistered home provider. In addressing each class ad seriatim,
the primary focus will be on the employee, or the second class because
of disparate treatment of this class.19 3
188. Note, supra note 147, at 250 (1959).
189. Id. at 251.
190. Wormuth, supra note 154, at 608.
191. Note, supra note 147, at 253. The author of Note, Punishment indicates that a trial or
hearing creates confusion because a court can consider a trial or hearing as a cure-all, justifying
dismissing the challenge. The writer opined that this view is unsound and advocated the more
sound view of focusing on intent, burden, and fixed class. Additionally, if a hearing is provided,
it must do more than judicially determine whether the defendant falls within the fixed class. The
hearing must afford the defendant an opportunity to challenge the constitutionally of the
legislation.
192. BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communication Commission, 162 F.3d 678, 690 (D.C. Cir.
1998), quoting, Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S.
841, 856 (1984) (the court incorporated the requirement, that the burdened individual show "un-
mistakable evidence of punitive intent" as a component of the third prong of the Nixon three
part test. A close reading of the Court's opinion in Selective Service System suggests this added
requirement may be misplaced. The Court in Selective Service System was considering state-
ments made by two Congressmen when it stated, "but such statements do not constitute 'the
unmistakable evidence of punitive intent which ... is required before a Congressional enactment
of this kind may be struck down,"' (emphasis added). The Court in Selective Service System was
considering whether legislation that sanctioned the denial of a noncontractual governmental
benefit, where the Court held no affirmative disability or restraint was imposed, is a bill of at-
tainder. The language "Congressional enactment of this kind" may be read to limit the Court's
"unmistakable evidence of punitive intent" language to legislation similar to that being consid-
ered in Selective Service System and Flemming. Section 110-90.2 is not such legislation.
193. The employee child care provider is terminated immediately upon notice of disqualifica-
tion pursuant to N.C. Admin. Code tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(g) and r. 3U.2704(d) (June 2000); the
nonregistered home provider may continue to operate and have payment suspended during the
civil action proceedings pursuant to N.C. Admin. Code tit. 10, r. 3U2704(h) and (i) (June 2000);
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In the first class, Administrative Procedure Act review is statutorily
provided for a child care operator. 94 An operator in this context is
limited to "owner" when the statute is considered in pari materia with
rules promulgated pursuant to this Article. 9 The conclusion that the
owner, and not an employee, may seek administrative review is con-
sistent with the rule, which states that "operator" includes the owner,
and "operator," and that "sponsor" or "licensee" may be used inter-
changeably with "owner".1 9 6 After all, it is the owner, operator, licen-
see or sponsor who is "the person or entity held legally responsible for
the child care business. 197
Additionally, one may look to the plain language of the statute and
the rules as further evidence that the legislature intended to grant only
the owner or operator a right to appeal the Department's determina-
tion regarding disqualification. The rule indicates that the
refusal on the part of the employer to dismiss a child day care provider
who has been found disqualified shall be grounds for suspension, de-
nial or revocation of the permit. If an employer, that is, an owner or
operator, appeals the administrative action, the child day care pro-
vider shall not be employed during the appeal process.
198
The third class, a nonregistered home provider, is an arrangement
whereby day care is provided in a home that is not subject to registra-
tion or licensure pursuant to section 110-86(2)-(4)199 or the require-
ments of section 110-106.2o The rules apply only to nonregistered
home providers which voluntarily choose to participate in the state
subsidized day care program. 20 A disqualified nonregistered home
and the operator/owner may file a contested case proceeding pursuant to section 150B-23, in
response to an attempt to revoke its license pursuant to section 110-90(5).
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-94 (1999) ("a child care operator shall have 30 days to file a
petition for a contested case pursuant to G.S. 150B-23") (Emphasis added); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 110-86(7) (1999). ("operator includes the owner, director or other person having primary re-
sponsibility for operation of a child care facility subject to licensing"); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10,
r. 3U.0102(19) (June 2000). ("Operator" means the person or entity held legally responsible for
the child care business. The term "operator", "sponsor", or "licensee" may be used
interchangeably).
195. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.0102(6) (June 2000). (Providing that 'child care pro-
vider' includes but is not limited to the following employees: facility director, administrative
staff, teacher, teacher's aide, cooks, maintenance personnel and drivers).
196. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.0102(18) (June 2000).
197. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.0102(19).
198. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r.3U.2702(h) (June 2000).
199. See supra note 5, and accompanying text.
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-106 (1999). (Providing that "religious sponsored child care facil-
ity" as used in this section shall include any child care facility or summer day camp operated by a
church, synagogue or school of religious charter," and that "[rieligious sponsored child care facil-
ities including summer day camps shall be exempt from the requirement that they obtain a li-
cense and that the license be displayed and shall be exempt from any subsequent rule or
regulatory program not dealing specifically with the minimum standards as provided in the appli-
cable provisions of G.S. § 110-91 .... ) (emphasis added).
201. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r.46G.0109(b) (June 2000).
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provider is subject to have payment terminated pending the outcome
of any appeal. 20 2  Pursuant to section 108A-79, the nonregistered
home provider is afforded three levels of appellate review. The first
review is local and is to be held within five days after the request is
made.20 3 If the nonregistered home provider is not satisfied, she may
appeal to the Department,20 4 and if there not satisfied, she may file a
civil suit in district court.20 5 In summary, the statutory and procedural
safeguards are more than sufficient to insulate the statute against chal-
lenge as applied prospectively or to convictions occurring after Janu-
ary 1, 1996. However, the disparate treatment of the classes, that is,
owner/operator, employee, and nonregistered home provider evinces
a legislative intent to punish the "fixed group" of each class.
In the second class, a child care provider who is an employee, as
opposed to an owner/operator, who disagrees with the Department's
disqualification decision may file a civil lawsuit in district court.20 6
Once an employer is notified that a childcare provider is disqualified,
the childcare provider's employment must be terminated.20 7 The re-
view process of the Department's disqualification decision has oner-
ous and vexatious consequences for employees as compared to an
owner/operator or nonregistered home provider.
The legislative denial of an employee's right to appeal the Depart-
ment's decision concerning disqualification is "unmistakable evidence
of punitive intent." First, the employee, nonregistered home provider,
and operator/owner are all similarly situated as it relates to providing
child care. If good moral character and fitness to have responsibility
for the safety and well being of children are the determining factors, it
is difficult to justify a difference in treatment concerning appellate re-
view. Neither the statute nor the rules provide a basis for the dispa-
rate treatment. Additionally, the employee who is adversely affected
202. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r.3U.2704(e) (June 2000) (The Department delegates to the
local purchasing agency the responsibility of denying payment to the nonregistered home pro-
vider for its services. It is clear that suspension of payment by the local purchasing agency is not
mandatory).
203. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79(e) (1999).
204. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79(g) (1999).
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79(k) (1999). (Providing that "[a]ny applicant or recipient who
is dissatisfied with the final decision of the Department may file, within 30 days of the receipt of
notice of such decision, a petition for judicial review in superior court of the county from which
the case arose."). There is an apparent conflict between the statute and the rule. The statute
requires filing in superior court, whereas the rule indicates the nonregistered home provider may
file a civil action in district court. See N.C. Admin. Code tit. 10, r. 3U.2704(i) (June 2000). The
legislative intent would apparently be to have all appellate [judicial] review heard in district
court. This view is consistent with section 110-90.2, and the commission rules promulgated to
carry out the intent of the statute. See Peoples Bank v. Loven, 90 S.E. 948 (N.C. 1916).
206. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(c), (d) (1999). See also, N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10,
r.3U.2704(i) (June 2000).
207. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(g) (June 2000).
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is the subject of the Department's action and is an obvious party, who
is entitled to administrative and judicial review. 0 8 However, the legis-
lature has determined that if this "fixed class" is to review the Depart-
ment's decision, it must initiate a civil lawsuit in district court.2 °9
There is a significant difference in appealing a judgment believed ren-
dered in error and initiating a civil lawsuit to vindicate a right believed
to be unjustly denied.
The employee suffers the most onerous impact of the three classes
because it is only this class of child care providers that must be imme-
diately terminated upon receipt by the employer of notice of disquali-
fication.210  Arguably, the employee will need to retain counsel to
prosecute the civil suit on her behalf. A civil action necessarily will
include drafting pleadings and the summons, submitting interrogato-
ries, preparing a request for production of documents, and taking
depositions.
It is axiomatic that the employee is in the least favorable position
financially to afford counsel fees when considered with the operator/
owner and nonregistered home provider. Additionally, the normal
delay of six to twelve months, or more, in having the matter heard
before a district court judge evinces a legislative intent to exclude em-
ployees convicted of crimes from serving as child care providers.21 ' As
a practical matter, a child care facility is loathe to rehire someone who
was previously administratively discharged at the behest of the same
Department that has the power to issue or deny the means of its liveli-
hood, that is, the issuance of the license for the child care facility.
Another factor indicative of "unmistakable evidence of punitive in-
tent" to punish the employee is the statutory provision denying to the
employee a copy of the criminal record forming the basis of her dis-
qualification.212 Rhetorically, how does one prepare a civil suit alleg-
ing maltreatment without knowing the basis of the Department's
208. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 6.1, at 272-73 (2nd. ed. 1984) (Further
providing that the individual who suffers the adverse effect of agency action should have the
"right to appear both at the administrative and judicial levels." A current trend in administrative
law is opening agency proceedings to greater public participation. "The law starts with the indi-
vidual who may be called the obvious party... [t]he individual ordered to do or not do specific
things, the applicant for a license or other grant ... ").
209. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r.3U.2704(i) (June 2000).
210. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r.3U.2702(g) (June 2000).
211. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court, discussing the necessity of provid-
ing welfare recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing to guard against erroneous termina-
tion, stated that "the crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of aid pending
resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
which to live while he waits." Id. at 264.
212. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 110-90.2(d) (1999). ("The Department shall not release nor disclose
any portion of the child care provider's criminal history to the child care provider or the child care
provider's employer or local purchasing agency.") (emphasis added).
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disqualifying decision? Chief Justice Burger speaking for the Court in
Selective Service Systems v. Minnesota Public Research Group,213
surmised that "Congress reasonably concluded that [The Military Se-
lective Service Act], 50 U.S.C. § 12(f) would be a strong tonic to many
nonregistrants. 214
The legislature here enacted section 110-90.2, which is a strong dose
of hemlock for child care providers with employee status and a prior
conviction. Therefore, the retroactive application to convictions of a
relevant crime prior to January 1, 1996, constitutes a bill of attainder.
The restrictions do fall within the historical meaning of legislative
punishment (disbarment of employment), they do not further
nonpunitive purposes, and there is unmistakable evidence of legisla-
tive intent to punish.
V. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
A. Due Process Analysis
This section examines the substantive due process issues concerning
section 110-90.2's criminal record check procedure as arbitrary and
unreasonable. First, a review will be conducted of two regulations: (1)
the rule permitting a child care provider to work as a conditional em-
ployee where the local record check indicates a conviction for which
she could be disqualified; and (2) the rule expanding the definition of
a child care provider to include those who, arguably, do not have con-
tact with children. Second, an analysis will be conducted of the statute
requiring submission of information necessary to conduct the record
check under the penalty of perjury, and the prospect of a criminal
conviction for providing false information. Additionally, an analysis
will be conducted of procedural due process issues concerning the
care provider's right to appellate review of the Department's decision
in determining qualification and fitness.
1. Substantive Due Process
Substantive Due Process considerations relate to a statute, its regu-
lations, or a statute in combination with its regulations.215 The same
213. Selective Service Systems v. Minnesota Public Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
214. Id. at 854.
215. See Erica Grubb, Day-Care Regulation: Legal and Policy Issues, 25 SANTA CLARA
L.REv. 301, 351 n.239 (1985). ("Substantive requirements are the standards and criteria which
day-care facilities must satisfy in order to be allowed to operate-such as adult/child ratios, sanita-
tion requirements, fire safety precautions, fingerprinting of teachers, etc. They differ from the
procedural requirements of day-care regulation (also subject to due process scrutiny), which in-
volves such things as appeals from agency decision, complaint procedure for parents, and the
manner in which agencies must formulate their standards."). See, also, Florida Public Employ-
ees Council 79 v. Department of Children and Families and Jeb Bush, 745 So.2d 487, 491 (1999)
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analytical approach generally applies to statutes, regulations, or a
combination of statutes and regulations. In each instance the concern
is whether the statute or regulation is arbitrary or unreasonable.216 A
court engaged in substantive due process review of a statutory chal-
lenge will evaluate the government's "ability to restrict freedom of
action regarding life, liberty, or property. ' '217 The statute is presumed
to be constitutional, and only the clearest proof of arbitrariness or un-
reasonableness will result in violation of substantive due process.218
However, an alternate legal theory applies to a challenged regula-
tion. This legal theory prohibits a regulation from exceeding the au-
thority granted by legislative delegation. 219 During judicial review of
a regulation, the court will ascertain whether the regulation or rule
promulgated pursuant to the statute is within the authority con-
ferred.22 ° If the rule or regulation exceeds the statutory grant of au-
thority, it is ultra vires. The initial determination is whether the
regulation or rule passes the ultra vires test.221 Following a determina-
tion that the rule is not ultra vires, the court will determine whether
the rule is reasonable, and not arbitrary.222 Otherwise, the regulation
or rule will be deemed inconsistent with the statutory purpose, and
invalidated.223
a. Ultra Vires Rule or Regulation?
Pursuant to the statutory scheme of which section 110-90.2 is a part,
the Commission is given the power to adopt rules and develop policies
for the implementation of Article 7 of the general statutes. 224 The
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services is em-
(appellants challenged the dismissal with prejudice by circuit court of their complaint challeng-
ing constitutionality of record check statute as applied to incumbent employees by Department
of Children and Families. The court stated that "three types of constitutional challenges may be
raised with regard to the administrative decision-making process of an executive agency ... (1)
the facial constitutionality of a statute authorizing an agency action, (2) the facial constitutional-
ity of an agency rule adopted to implement a constitutional provision or a statute, or (3) the
unconstitutionality of the agency's action in implementing a constitutional statute or rule." Id.
The court held that appellants were entitled to bring a declaratory judgment action alleging a
facial challenge to the constitutionality of statutory employment screening requirements, but
remainder of complaint was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
216. Grubb, supra note 215, at 352.
217. Nowak, John E. & Rotunda, Ronald D., Constitutional Law, § 11.4 at 369 (4th ed.
1991).
218. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
219. SCHWARTZ, supra note 208, § 4.4 at 153. See, also, Grubb, supra note 215, at 352.
220. SCHWARTZ, supra note 208, § 4.4 at 153.
221. Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
222. In re Permanent Surface Mining Reg. Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).
223. Manhattan General Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
224. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-88(5) (1999).
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powered to carry out the policies and rules of the Commission.225 The
rule allowing a child care provider convicted of a crime, including but
not limited to those specified in section 110-90.2, is promulgated by
the Commission, and is carried out by the Division under the direction
of the Secretary.226 The pertinent question is whether the rule
promulgated by the Commission and carried out by the Division is
ultra viries, that is, whether the rule is arbitrary, unreasonable, or in-
consistent with the purpose of the statute.
The purpose of the statute is to protect children in child care facili-
ties by providing a physically safe and healthy environment where
children are cared for by persons of good moral character.227 Persons
excluded by statute are those who have been convicted of a crime
involving child neglect, child abuse, or moral turpitude, or suffer other
conditions inimical to the health and well-being of children.228 The
statute proscribes the employment of certain individuals, and where
an individual has been convicted of a crime barred by the statute, the
Commission or the Division does not have the authority to grant con-
ditional employment.229 Ostensibly, in some instances the Division
will not know of the disqualifying conviction prior to receipt of the
state or national record check. However, where the local record
check reveals a conviction excluded by statute, the administrative rule
is difficult to reconcile with the statutory restriction.230 This rule ex-
ceeds the scope of delegated authority, and is contrary to the express
language of the statute, rendering it ultra vires.231 Thus, this rule is
invalid because it is inconsistent with, and not reasonably related to
the purpose of the statute.232
Section 110-90.2(2)(a) defines "child care provider" as a person
"who is employed by a child care facility ... and has contact with the
children . . . ."233(emphasis added). In complete derogation of the
statute, the Department seeks to redefine "child care provider"
through the promulgation of an Administrative Code rule.23 4 The De-
225. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90(5) (1999).
226. See N. C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(a) (June 2000).
227. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-85(1) (1999).
228. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(8) (1999). See generally, Atkins v. Department of Social Ser-
vices, 284 N.W.2d 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming denial of renewal of license where appel-
lant had history of heroin addiction, continued to use drugs, and did not have the character to
assure the welfare of day care children).
229. Id.
230. See supra, note 46. See also, Atkins, 284 N.W.2d 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
231. SCHWARTZ, supra note 208, § 4.4 at 153-54. ("Agency power to make rules extends no
further than the authority given by the relevant statutory delegation," and the ultra vires test
"[i]nsures that the agency has not exceeded the power delegated by the legislature").
232. Id.
233. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(a)(2)(a) (1999).
234. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.0102(6) (June 2000).
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partment exceeded the scope of its statutory authority by expanding
the definition of child care provider to include employees arguably
not intended by the legislature. The statute's definition of child care
provider is very specific, including employees, owners and operators,
and children over 15 years of age who are members of the household
in a family care home and are present when children are in care. The
statutorily imposed limitation applies to employees who have contact
with children. The Department's definition, however, includes em-
ployees who normally do not have contact with children, such as
maintenance personnel and cooks, without regard to whether this
group of employees has contact with children. The Department's at-
tempt to redefine a "child care provider" is ultra vires, inconsistent
with the purpose of the statute, and thus invalid. 35
b. Statute Arbitrary and Unreasonable?
North Carolina General Statute § 110-90.2(c)provides that "any
child care provider who intentionally falsifies any information re-
quired to be furnished to conduct the criminal history shall be guilty
of a class 2 misdemeanor. ' 236 The statute also provides that "refusal
to consent to a criminal history check is grounds for the Department
to prohibit the child care provider from providing child care." 237 Con-
sequently, the statute provides an incentive for all persons who desire
to be employed as a child care provider to provide truthful informa-
tion for the criminal history check.
The Department promulgated a rule applicable to those individuals
previously convicted of a criminal offense other than a minor traffic
violation. Pursuant to the Department's rule, one must sign a state-
ment subject to a penalty of perjury.238 Perjury is a crime codified by
statute in North Carolina, and is punishable as a Class F felony.2 39
The punishment exposure for providing false information if previously
convicted of a crime far exceeds the statutorily prescribed punishment
for giving false information generally. 24 ° Arguably, the Department
exceeds its authority by promulgating a rule increasing punishment
prescribed by statute. The rule is ultra vires, inconsistent with legisla-
235. See Atkins v. Dept. of Social Services, 284 N.W.2d 794, 800 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (ten-
sion between administrative rule extending departments inquiry to character of all persons living
in family day care home, where statute limits promulgation of administrative rules to considera-
tion of only those persons who are directly responsible for the children). See also, SCHWARTZ,
supra note 208, § 4.4 at 154.
236. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(c) (1999).
237. Id.
238. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(b) (June 2000).
239. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-209 (1999).
240. N.C. GEN. STAT § 15A-1340.17(c) (1999).
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tive intent, and is invalid.241 Moreover, the rule is arbitrary and un-
reasonable, because it singles out for harsher treatment prospective
child care providers previously convicted of a crime.242
The United States Supreme Court has consistently applied the ra-
tional basis test in the area of economic and social welfare legislation,
conferring a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely
that a challenged statute bear a rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest.243 In Lopez v. McMahon, a California appeals court
stated that "the cardinal principle of substantive due process is that a
law which deprives a person of life, liberty or property must not be the
product of arbitrary legislative judgment. Such a law must be reason-
ably related to the object sought to be obtained by its enactment. 244
The legislative judgment to enact a statute requiring that all pro-
spective child care providers provide information utilized in checking
their criminal history furthers the State's legitimate interest in protect-
ing children in child care facilities. The legislation represents a sound
policy determination rationally related to the objective of averting po-
tential harm to day care children by providing a physically safe and
healthy environment where children are cared for by persons of good
moral character.245 However, to impose a criminal penalty for provid-
ing false information is problematic.
The poignant issue here is not whether the legislature has authority
to enact the statute, but whether the methods it or the Department
has chosen in so doing is arbitrary or unreasonable so as to offend
constitutional guarantees of individual rights.246 The Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a state from
denying "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.",247 The Law of the Land clause provides "no person shall be
...deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the law of the
land. ' 248 For purposes of this analysis, we posit that the provisions of
section 110-90.2 implicate a liberty interest sufficient to invoke due
241. See supra notes 231-235, and accompanying text.
242. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973).
243. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
244. Lopez v. McMahon, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1510, 1518 (1988) (denying a constitutional chal-
lenge to the code section of California Child Day Care Facilities Act, which automatically denies
a license to operate a day care facility to an applicant residing with an adult convicted of a
violent felony).
245. Id. at 1519. See also, supra notes 1 and 239, and accompanying text.
246. See generally, Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group,
468 U.S. 841 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
247. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
248. N.C. CONST. Art. I, § 19. See also, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983) (Due
Process Clause protects liberty interest created under state law in addition to federal liberty
interest).
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process protection under federal and state law.24 9 Once disqualified, a
child care provider is presumptively barred for life from working in
child care. In situations where one is deprived not only of present
employment and future opportunity for employment, but a stigma is
imposed, foreclosing the opportunity for future employment, the
courts have found a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause. °
To determine whether a substantive right protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause has been violated, it is necessary to balance the liberty
interest at issue against the state's asserted reasons for restraining that
interest.251 The child care provider's interest here is to remain em-
ployed or employable, and not be permanently disqualified from
working in her chosen profession. The state's interest is for the child
care provider to provide truthful information regarding any prior con-
viction other than a minor traffic violation. Arguably, the State's in-
terest, ultimately, is to protect children in child care facilities.
The statutory provision requiring prospective child care providers
to provide information used in the criminal record check does not vio-
late substantive due process. In Henry v. Earhart2 5 2 , plaintiffs ap-
pealed on substantive due process grounds the denial of a permanent
injunction challenging the application of a Employment Background
and Criminal Record Checks statute as a class of employees of private
nursery schools and other preschool education programs who are sub-
ject to regulations promulgated by defendant.5 3 Two of plaintiffs'
contentions were that the regulations violated their due process rights
by imposing a presumption of guilt on the disqualified, and that the
regulations invaded their right to privacy by making the criminal
records and fingerprints available to the commissioner of education.
The court denied each of these contentions, finding that gathering the
information for the criminal record checks "merely require, as part of
the licensing or employment process, certain background information
249. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (The term liberty as guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment has not been defined by the Court with exactness. However, liberty
denotes more than merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to
contract, and to engage in any of the common occupations of life) (emphasis added). See also,
Petition of Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d 590, 592 (N.H. 1998) (Petitioner alleged to have abused
children challenged decision of Division for Children, Youth and Families to enter his name into
central registry based on allegations of child abuse which would essentially bar him from work-
ing with children and cause him to be unemployed and unemployable in his profession. His
interest in his profession was a protected liberty interest).
250. Roth, 408 U.S. at 574. See also, Petition of Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d 590, 592 (N.H.
1998); Lee Tr v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1250 (N.Y. 1996).
251. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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to ensure the safety of the children to be cared for. '254 On balance,
the equities here arguably weigh in favor of the state.
Unlike no other similar state statute, section 110-90.2 imposes a
criminal penalty for providing false information. The specter of pun-
ishment by criminal prosecution raises issues not addressed by statute
or the Department's rule under the Fifth Amendment: no provision
for Miranda warnings, and the use of any statement given as self in-
criminating evidence; Sixth Amendments right to counsel during the
criminal prosecution; the question of who will prefer the charges on
behalf of the Department, and what process will issue; matters of
proof where the statement was not given under oath or affirmation, or
in a judicial proceeding as required to prove perjury. Stated differ-
ently, "the primary restrictions on the criminal process are the result
of the application of the principles of the Bill of Rights. The guaran-
tees of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eight amendments restrict the ways
in which the government may investigate as well as prosecute some-
one for a criminal charge." '255 The aforementioned amendments en-
compass specific requirements:
(1) respect for individual rights to privacy and freedom from self-in-
crimination in the investigative process; (2) that the person not twice
be placed in jeopardy for the same offense; (3) prompt processing of
the charges; (4) that the trial of the charges be public; (5) that the
charges be tried before an impartial jury; (6) fair notice of the charges
and a chance to prepare a defense; (7) the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses; (8) compulsory process to obtain favorable wit-
nesses and evidence (9) the assistance of counsel; (10) that excessive
bail not be used to keep the individual in custody prior to the termina-
tion of the prosecution; (11) that the punishment not be excessive or
cruel.256
This provision is fraught with legal issues not addressed by the statute
or Department rule.
The information provided is not utilized in the qualification deter-
mination process, as the Department does not render a decision con-
cerning qualification until the record check process is complete. 7
Therefore, the statutory provision and Department's rule impose re-
strictions on liberty that are not reasonably related to a legitimate
state objective and are tantamount to punishment.258 Moreover, the
254. Id. at 128.
255. NOWAK AND ROTUNDA, supra note 217, § 13.9, at 534.
256. Id. at 535
257. See N.C. ADMIN. CODF tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(e). ("The Division shall notify the child care
provider in writing of the determination by the Division of the individual's fitness to have re-
sponsibility for the safety and well-being of children based on the criminal history.") (emphasis
added).
258. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982).
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state's interest in receiving truthful information could be as effectively
served by admonishing prospective child care providers that provide
false information will result in immediate disqualification and termi-
nation of employment. On balance, the equities here arguably weigh
in favor of the individual.
2. Procedural Due Process
"The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the dep-
rivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of liberty and property. When protected interests are im-
plicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. '259 It
was determined in substantive due process discussion that the child
care providers have a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.26° The legislature has sought to protect that interest by pro-
viding that a child care provider, who is not satisfied with the Depart-
ment's decision, may file a civil suit in district court within sixty days
of receiving notice of disqualification.26'
The question is whether the post disqualification procedure, filing a
civil law suit, afforded by the legislature is sufficient or proper under
the circumstances. A court must utilize the Mathews v. Eldridge262
three factors balancing test to resolve this question:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedure used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requisite would
entail.263
a. Mathews v. Eldridge, First Prong Analysis
During consideration of the first prong of the analysis, the court in
Petition of Preisendorfer, held that "an individual right to work within
259. Board of Regents of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972).
260. See Petition of Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d 590 (N.H. 1998).
261. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.2(d) (1999). Additionally, N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10,
r.3U.2704(i), applicable to nonregistered home providers, indicates that "if a nonregistered
home provider disagrees with the decision of disqualification and files a civil action in district
court, the provider may continue to operate but shall not receive payment during the proceed-
ings." But see, N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 46G.0215 (June 2000) (granting the nonregistered
day care home providers a right to appeal following procedures for grant-in-aid programs pursu-
ant to section 108A-79).
262. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
263. Id. at 335. See also, NOWAK AND ROTUNDA, supra note 217, § 13.8, at 531 (stating that
"all courts must now employ the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine the type of
procedures that are required by due process when a governmental action would deprive an indi-
vidual of a constitutionality protected liberty or property interest.").
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one's profession is a 'privilege of fundamental significance.' 2 64 In
Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court held that prior to a person being
deprived of a protected property or liberty interest, "he must be af-
forded opportunity for some kind of hearing, except for extraordinary
situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that jus-
tifies postponing the hearing until after the event. 265 Notwithstand-
ing any controversy concerning what is due process, the United States
Supreme Court has held "it is fundamental that except in emergency
situations (and this is not one) due process requires that when a State
seeks to terminate (a protected) interest. . ., it must afford 'notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before
the termination becomes effective. '266 The last two prongs of the
analysis address the risk of error and the state interest, and any at-
tendant fiscal and administrative burdens.
b. Mathews v. Eldridge, Second Prong Analysis
The risk of erroneous deprivation of the protected interest through
the procedures used places the brunt, if not the entire risk of error, on
the disqualified child care provider. Arguably, the Department has
unbridled discretion to qualify or disqualify a child care provider not-
withstanding the nature of the conviction, except as provided by sec-
tion 110-91(8).267 It is significant that neither the statute nor the
Departmental rule provides a minimum standard of proof before dis-
qualification. Minimum due process requires an identifiable standard
of proof that reflects not only the weight of the individual and state's
interests, but also ensures objective and consistent consideration of
the competing interests.268
However, the Department rule provides that "determination by the
Division that the prospective child day care provider is disqualified is
reasonable cause to deny issuance of a permit. '269  Reasonable
cause2 70 and probable cause 271 are synonymous terms and may be
used interchangeably. To the extent that the Department utilized the
264. Petition of Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d 590, 593 (N.H. 1998); see also, Lee TT v. Dowling,
664 N.E.2d 1243, 1250(N.Y. 1996) (an individual's interest in continuing his employment is
substantial).
265. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
266. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971).
267. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(8) (1999).
268. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) (standing for the proposition that due
process, at a minimum, requires the adoption of a standard of proof that reflects the weight of
the private and public interest affected).
269. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(f) (June 2000).
270. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1138 (5th ed. 1991) (defining reasonable cause as the "basis
for arrest without a warrant, is such state of facts as would lead man of ordinary care and pru-
dence to believe and conscientiously entertain honest and strong suspicion that person sought to
be arrested is guilty of crime.").
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"reasonable cause" standard to disqualify one convicted of a crime as
a child care provider, the probable cause standard was expressly re-
jected as the proper standard, in favor of "by preponderance of evi-
dence," standard as used by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
Petition of Preisendorfer.2 12 In Preisendorfer, the court stated that
"the probable cause standard of proof falls between suspicion and
preponderance of the evidence, where proof by preponderance
'means that evidence, taken as a whole, shows that [the] fact or cause
shown to be proven is more probable than not. '27 3 The probable
cause standard may be utilized to allow officials to take emergency
action. "It is not justified, however, when it results in a 'permanent
denial of the right to employment in the childcare field without any
consideration of the accuracy of the fact finding process.' ,274
The procedure currently provides that the child care provider with a
record of a potentially disqualifying conviction may submit additional
information concerning the conviction that could be used, and the De-
partment may consider other relevant information. 75 Moreover, a
child care provider who is terminated and files a civil action in district
court is unemployed during the litigation process. More importantly,
even if the child care provider wins the civil suit, there is no adequate
remedy, because her position will have been filled; the child care facil-
ity is not obligated to pay back wages; and the child care facility and
Department, arguably are granted immunity by statute.276
c. Mathews v. Eldridge, Third Prong Analysis
The governmental interests include protecting children, and avoid-
ing the increased administrative and fiscal burdens which result from
increased procedural requirements. These interests have been recog-
nized as significant by other jurisdictions.277 The fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that a hearing would impose prior to disqualification
and/or termination is minimal as compared to engaging the full blown
ligation process of a trial in district court for each person disqualified
271. BLACK'S LAW DIGTONARY 1081 (5th ed. 1991) (defining probable cause as
"[r]easonable cause; having more evidence for than against. A reasonable ground for belief in
the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of .....
272. See Petition of Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d 590, 593 (N.H. 1998).
273. Id. at 593 (citing State v. 77,014.00 Dollars, 607 So.2d 576, 581-82 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
274. Id. (citing Dietz v. Damas, 948 F.Supp. 198, 209 n. 18 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)).
275. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r.3U.2702(b) (June 2000).
276. See N.C. GEN. STAT. 110-90.2(f) (1999) (providing that "[t]here shall be no liability for
negligence on the part of an employer of a child care provider, an owner or operator of a child
care facility, a State or local agency, or employees of a State or local agency, arising from any
action taken or omission by any of them in carrying out the provisions of this section ....").
277. See Petition of Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d 590, 593 (1998); Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d
1243, 1251 (N.Y. 1996); Cavarretta v. DCFS, 660 N.E.2d 250, 258 (I11. App. Ct. 1996).
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and terminated from employment. The risk of harm to children in not
appreciably greater because the child care provider has been allowed
to be employed as a conditional employee pending receipt of the crim-
inal record check.278 This is the case even where the local record
check indicates a potentially disqualifying conviction.
B. Equal Protection Analysis
The Equal Protection Clause, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." '27 9 The Equal Protection
Clause has not been interpreted to require that all persons be treated
alike, but more a "direction that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike."28 (Emphasis added) For purposes of this paper, the
analysis will be limited in two respects: (1) a comparison of the stat-
ute's and Department's treatment of child care providers who are em-
ployees with their treatment of child care providers who are owners or
operators, including nonregistered day care home and nonregistered
home providers; and (2) a comparison of section 110-90.2's considera-
tion of a conviction by a child care provider with the statutory consid-
eration of other individuals with convictions providing services to
other vulnerable persons.
As child care providers, owners, operators, and employees of a child
care facility are similarly situated pursuant to Cleburne Living
Center.281 The disparate treatment of these different classes of child
care providers is found in the right to appeal the Department's deci-
sion, and the application of the Administrative Procedure Act to oper-
ators.282 Similarly, a nonregistered home provider who disagrees with
a Department's decision and files a civil action in district court may
continue to operate but shall not receive payment during the litigation
proceedings.283 Additionally, any nonregistered day care home who
appeals a decision by the local purchasing agency, where the Depart-
ment authorizes the local purchasing agency to make the decision,
shall follow the appeals procedure for grant-in-aid programs pursuant
to section 108A-79.284 Thus, it would appear that child care providers
who are owners/operators have a right to appeal, either pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act or section 108A-79, while the re-
278. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r.3U.2702(d) (June 2000).
279. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
280. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
281. Id.
282. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 110-94 (1999).
283. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2704(i) (June 2000).
284. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 46G.0215 (June 2000).
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course for child care providers who are employees is to file a civil
action in district court.
The classification here is owner, operator or employee child care
provider. The classification does not involve a suspect class or quasi-
suspect class; therefore, heightened scrutiny does not apply.285 The
distinctions here need only be rationally related to a legitimate State
interest.28 6 The legislature could have rationally concluded that an
owner or operator, because of her economic investment, is deserving
of an appeals process that does not require an immediate loss of in-
come or the resources necessary to prosecute a civil law suit in district
court.
A comparison of investigation requirements and use of criminal
records checks, where care is rendered to children, the elderly, mental
health patients, the sick and the disabled, and a criminal record check
and the investigation requirements pursuant to section 110-90.2 show
a disparate treatment of child care providers.2s7 For individuals other
than child care providers, if an applicant's criminal record check
reveals a conviction, the conviction shall not automatically prohibit
employment. The following factors SHALL be considered by the De-
partment or Office determining whether employment shall be denied:
(1) The level and seriousness of the crime;
(2) The date of the crime;
(3) The age of the person at the time of the conviction;
(4) The circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, if
known;
(5) The nexus between the criminal conduct of the person and job
duties of the person;
(6) The prison, jail, probation, parole, rehabilitation, and employment
records of the person since the date the crime was committed; and
(7) The subsequent commission by the person of a crime listed in sub-
section (a) of this section. 288
A child care provider previously convicted of a crime pursuant to
G.S. 110-90.2 and rules promulgated pursuant to the statute may sub-
mit additional information which the Department could consider in
making a decision.289 The burden is on the child care provider to sub-
mit the information. The Department has discretion to consider or
not consider the information submitted. Pursuant to other vulnerable
person statutes, the same information shall be obtained, whether sub-
mitted by the applicant or obtained by other means. Further, the Di-
285. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991).
286. Id.
287. See generally, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-19.3 (1999).
288. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-19.6(d) (1999).
289. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 3U.2702(c) (June 2000).
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vision may consider the information, unlike pursuant to section 114-
19.6, where the Department or Office shall consider the informa-
tion.290 Applying the rational basis test, the statute arguably will be
held constitutional and not violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
However, care providers who are subject to a criminal record check
and are considered for employment pursuant to section 110-90.2 are
treated differently than other care providers similarly situated.
VI. CONCLUSION
The North Carolina General Assembly was correct in enacting leg-
islation requiring a criminal history check for all child care providers.
However, as I have argued in this Article, the statute provides little
protection for children. Moreover, the protection, to the extent that
such protection is provided, is virtually invisible. The number of chil-
dren substantiated as abused or neglected in this state has remained
relatively constant for the years 1994/1995 through 1999/2000, which is
the last year data is available. Annually, of the more than one hun-
dred thousand allegations of abuse and neglect, approximately thirty
thousand are substantiated. This is indeed a disturbing statistic. Fur-
thermore, it is axiomatic that the criminal record check statute fails to
address approximately 98.5% of the child abuse or neglect occurring
in this state.
Since more than ninety percent of the children abused or neglected
suffer maltreatment at the hand of someone other than a child care
provider in a day care facility, the lack of a Central Registry search
requirement renders the statute's protection of children from mal-
treatment very much like the Emperor's Clothes-invisible. Use of the
Central Registry information would alert the Department and Social
Services Agencies in each county of situations potentially dangerous
to children. Additionally, where the local record check indicates a dis-
qualifying conviction, the prospective child care provider should be
deemed qualified by the Department before being allowed to provide
child care in a facility. I would recommend that the time to complete
the record check procedure be shortened to two weeks. Children are
our most cherished and important resource, and we should endeavor
to protect, nourish and provide a safe and healthy environment for
each child.
An equally important consideration is protection of the individual
rights of each citizen. Those individuals found to be dangerous to
children by competent evidence prior to disqualification should not be
permitted to have responsibility for their care. Conversely, a criminal
290. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-19.6(d) (1999).
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conviction which has no logical nexus to providing high quality child
care should not disqualify an individual who has chosen child care as
his or her avocation. As a practical matter, an act of youthful indiscre-
tion or an exercise of poor judgment on one occasion should not serve
as a permanent bar to employment as child care provider. If it is to be
the viable statute the legislature intended, section 110-90.2 must, un-
like the Emperor's New Clothes, in fact clothe and protect the child as
well as adult citizens.
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